

Tilting Daley's Machine—*Ralph Whitehead*

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COMMONWEAL

APR 24 1969

THE MYTH OF THE JURY TRIAL

GERALD L. HALLWORTH



THE MAN IN THE CUTAWAY COAT

LEO R. WARD

IS UNBELIEF BELIEVABLE?

HARVEY COX

A STRANGE WORLD INDEED

PETER STEINFELS

NO CASH FOR THE SCHOOLS

WILLIAM R. GRANT

7

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CINCINNATI STATION
CINCINNATI, OHIO

NEWS AND VIEWS

The Nixon Administration has decided against cashing in Peru out of the foreign aid program, and pious poses are struck anew of American forbearance and benevolence. Don't be fooled.

There is far more self-interest than altruism in the "restraint" of the U.S. over Peru's expropriation of the International Petroleum Company (IPC), a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey.

First, IPC is small potatoes in the Standard Oil patch. (So is Peru, for that matter. Its national budget is less than 10 percent of Standard Oil's sales for last year.) Secondly, there are the interests of other American firms in Peru to keep in mind, and thirdly, the old anti-Americanism business, tense enough without making things worse.

In sum, there's more to lose by getting tough with Peru than there is to be gained, by far.

Invocation of the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act would cut off what from Peru? \$40 million in economic aid and between \$30 and \$40 million in sugar supports. What's that in the total Latin American account? Peanuts.

Between 1951 and 1963, \$6.9 billion in net capital moved from the U.S. to Latin America. But the outflow from Latin America to the U.S. for the same period was \$11.9 billion—a balance of \$5 billion in the U.S. favor.

No sharp trader would want to jeopardize that arrangement, and Uncle Sam learned from Trader Horn. Ask Canada.

The value of U.S.-owned businesses in Canada is now \$18 billion, and continues to grow—without any large transfer of so-called risk capital. Only 15 percent of the U.S. gross investment in Canada actually comes from the U.S.; 73 percent is from retained earnings and 12 percent from other Canadian sources.

Between 1960 and 1967, the U.S. economy received over \$1 billion more from its Canadian subsidiaries than it

contributed to them in direct capital outlays. With royalties, licenses and management fees added, the excess is more like \$2 billion.

Canadian Dimension charges that "foreign investment has clearly become a primary instrument for transferring wealth from the rest of the world to the U.S.A." An extreme statement, perhaps, but the figures do not entirely belie the charge. For years the U.S. has been carefully constructing what *Canadian Dimension* accurately labels a "branch plant economy." Witness:

U.S. assets and investments in foreign countries reached an awesome \$122.3 billion in 1967, the last year for which official figures are available. About half (\$59.3 billion) is U.S. ownership in foreign enterprises. The total is nearly double the 1960 figure and five times that of 1950.

Net capital outflow supporting the latter was \$3 billion for 1967; income (net after foreign withholding taxes) was \$4.5 billion. (U.S. foreign aid is approximately \$1.3 billion, a paltry 0.57 percent of the national income.)

Where does one come by such loaded data? The U.S. Department of Commerce publication, *Survey of Current Business* [October, 1968].

The differences between Secretary of State Rogers and Defense Secretary Laird on defense and foreign policy issues (first-strike intentions of Russia; ABM and arms control talks, etc.) may be, as the apologists would say, tactical, or, as the benign would have it, freshman uncertainty. But the spectacle isn't very reassuring.

At hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the ABM, Senator Fulbright sought to fathom the differences during the Rogers appearance. Frustration. "I should not have brought up the question," Fulbright commented. "You're just destroying what little confidence I've had in you."

Nor does reassurance recover when

one moves from political theory to what should be elementary facts.

At Senate hearings last month, both Laird and Deputy Defense Secretary Packard were firm that the Minuteman (the missile which the ABM is supposed to protect) could be disarmed in flight so that it would not cause a nuclear explosion if launched in error or if it whipped off course.

"You have to provide them with a continuing command to keep them going," said Packard. "If they don't get the command then they won't continue. That is the safe protection that is used."

Laird reiterated the point: "You can have it (the Minuteman) land without a nuclear explosion, I know that . . ."

Laird testified March 20. On April 3 he sent a one-sentence revision of his testimony to the committee: "Offensive weapons cannot be self-destructed."

Father John J. White of St. Philip's Church, Boston, quit the stage of Faneuil Hall during a memorial service for Martin Luther King.

"I cannot play such a role because the Church I represent has very little to do with the people and the causes which meant so much to Dr. King and for which he gave his life.

"The poor, the oppressed, the victims of war are not the priority of the Catholic Church in Boston, nor, in my judgment, of the Protestant denominations and the Temple."

Spring Styles Department:

—The *London Tablet* reveals that "as the first order of business" the new Archbishop of Hartford, Conn., has directed that priests "secure a biretta" and wear it at prescribed times.

—Dr. Edward E. Sampson of the University of California avers that "being in the ROTC at Berkeley is somewhat like wearing a tuxedo to a formal dance at a nudist camp."

—Finally, Gimbels is advertising a see-through bra for the girl who "is going to dare to bare and may need a little support, moral (sic) and otherwise."

JOHN DEEDY

CORRESPONDENCE

Barrientos Defended

Lexington, Ky.

To the Editors: Robert Carl Hirschfield's article on Bolivia, "Barrientos, the man Who Captured Ché," [Feb. 14] is so riddled with errors—I count at least 12 of fact or emphasis—and obvious biases that it can only be considered a minor classic in the malpractice of journalism. As a former newspaperman and present professor of Latin American history, I can only conclude that Hirschfield simply did not do his homework before charging off to Latin America. And he seems to have found exactly what he went looking for, in the traditional pseudo-liberal mold: that the greatest enemies of Latin American progress are the military and foreign capitalists. These stereotypes hardly constitute news and certainly do not constitute truth in the case of Bolivia under Barrientos.

After my own research and residence in Bolivia, I agree with former United States ambassador Douglas Henderson, a warm friend to Bolivian aspirations, that Barrientos is one of the most impressive political leaders in Latin America today and that he has implemented the Bolivian National Revolution to an extent of which Paz Estenssoro never would have been capable. In agrarian reform, for example, Barrientos is making meaningful the earlier widescale distribution of land by providing needed auxiliary aids such as credit facilities, technical assistance, social services and infrastructure. In the field of the military itself, Barrientos was one who first proposed and endorsed the Civic Action programs whereby previously predatory military establishments have been brought into the service of the people through helping build or operate public works. As for those nasty foreign investors in Bolivia today, it seems strange that the principal architect for the agreement with Gulf Oil, for example, was not Barrientos but his Marxist minister of government, Antonio Arguedas, who

(Continued on page 182)

NEWS & VIEWS: 154

EDITORIALS: 155

CHICAGO VOTERS TILT MAYOR DALEY'S MACHINE:

Ralph Whitehead 157

THE STRANGE WORLD OF G. WARREN NUTTER: Peter Steinfels 158
IS UNBELIEF BELIEVABLE?: Harvey Cox 159

THE MYTH OF THE JURY TRIAL: Gerald L. Hallworth 161

PUBLIC SCHOOLS FEEL THE MONEY PINCH: William R. Grant 167

A TRIBUTE TO BEN SHAHN: Corita Kent 168-169

THE MAN IN THE CUTAWAY COAT: Leo R. Ward 170

VERSE: Harold Witt 164

RECORDS: B. H. Haggin 170 SCREEN: Philip T. Hartung 172

BOOKS: 173

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VINDICATION AT C.U.

Ever since the Condemnation of 1277, which anathematized Sorbonne philosophers for their unseemly Averroism, the Catholic university has been faced with the delicate problem of providing dogmatic guns as well as scholarly butter. Although academic freedom does not breed easily in the sacred sciences, the conflict between confessional allegiance and professorial responsibility has been gradually decided in favor of the latter. The vindication of the 20 C.U. professors who publicly contested the conclusions of *Humanae Vitae* last summer is part of the spiraling dialectic toward total liberty of inquiry in matters of faith and morals. Father Curran and his colleagues precipitated this current imbroglio by stating shortly after the release of the encyclical that "... as Roman Catholic theologians, conscious of our duty and our limitations, we conclude that spouses may responsibly decide according to their conscience that artificial contraception in some circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to preserve and foster the values and sacredness of marriage." For this sort of non-incendiary demurrer Curran *et al.* were called in by Catholic University Chancellor, Cardinal O'Boyle, to explain their conduct. When the professors refused to recant, the Board of Trustees forced an investigation into "the style and method whereby some faculty members expressed personal dissent from Papal teaching, and apparently helped organize additional public dissent to such teaching. At no time in this inquiry is there any attempt by the board to question the right of a scholar to have or to hold private dissent on Papal teaching not defined as infallible." After five months in which 20 meetings were held, 38 witnesses heard and 3,000 pages of exhibits examined, a faculty committee of five, selected by the C.U. academic senate, now declares the defendants not guilty and chastens the trustees for disregarding the protocols of academic freedom.

The recommendations of the faculty committee are blunt; that the University recognize that the Curran statement is supported by theological

25 April 1969: 155

scholarship, and the attendant actions of the professors in no way violated their commitments to the University or the theological community at large; that no further proceedings be initiated that would question the professors' status at C.U. in regard to the encyclical; that the University speedily incorporate those norms of academic freedom and due process suggested in the report; that the University insist to the academic community that it will nevermore react in similar situations with the threat of suspension, without prior due process, and that all decisions on the acceptability of theological scholarship be reserved to one's academic peers; and that the trustees realize that executive power-plays have no place in academic concerns.

The conclusions regarding the subject professors are equally to the point: the *cause célèbre* statement was entirely responsible; there is no convincing evidence that it could be regarded as a "Catholic University statement"; its content and style do not flout academic propriety and a faculty member cannot be attacked for embarrassing his institution in its relationship with various constituencies; the use of the media cannot be considered out of bounds for issues of this magnitude; and the Profession of Faith taken by the professors does not clash with their reaction to *Humanae Vitae*.

The conclusions regarding the norms of licit dissent are the most important items in the verdict: the report correctly emphasizes that several AAUP declarations have considered similar disputes and that adherence to their norms ought to be sufficient for Catholic University; it also mentions the adequacy of the 1960 norms of the American Association of Theological Schools as instructive on the grounds of alleged professional incompetence with respect to theology and the demands of a particular confessional association; whenever a theologian's competence is questioned, whether on deviation from faith or other scholarly grounds, judgment must be restricted to his academic peer group; extra-mural utterances should not be at issue when considering teaching competence as long as the scholar takes the normal precautions as laid down by the AAUP; and no special norms are required because of the pontifical character of Catholic University.

This document is clearly a blanket approval of Curran and Company. It is difficult to imagine a contrary result. For the C.U. 20 were hardly isolated in their dissent. Hundreds of theologians endorsed their stand in public fashion. Apart from the otherworldly theological dispute and the inevitable wrangle magisterium occasioned by *Humanae Vitae*, the academic freedom clause was too obvious to succumb to hierarchical politics.

If the committee report had temporized on this crucial matter, the credibility of C.U. would have suffered irrevocably. In spite of the liberal triumph and the landmark breakthrough on the right of theological dissent, one must lament that this crisis ever occurred.

DISARMING THE PENTAGON

The Pentagon's research chief of the Eisenhower era, Herbert York, was hardly overstating when, in calling on Congress last month to halt the growth of the U.S. military machine, he envisioned the military becoming "a Frankenstein monster." Defense Department figures on the value of the U.S. military establishment had just been made public and they supported the most pessimistic descriptive allusion: \$100 billion in warships, planes, tanks, guns; \$43.8 billion in supplies and equipment; \$38.7 billion in real estate; \$20 billion in other items, adding to a total of \$202.5 billion. Scaled to the U.S. population, the total amounts to \$1,000 a person.

As if those figures might not have been convincing enough, now comes a 1,200-page study of U.S. defense strategy requirements for the coming decade, the net effect of which is to strip away the last camouflage to the essentially militarist character of U.S. presence in the world. The study shows the U.S. ringing the world with 429 major and 2,297 lesser overseas military bases, covering 4,000 square miles in 30 foreign countries, containing 1,750,000 servicemen, families and foreign employees, and costing \$4.8 billion a year to maintain. Uncle Sam is a G.I. with an M-14.

The study of U.S. overseas bases was released reluctantly by the Administration, and accompanied by a chorus of downgrading comment from national security advisor Henry Kissinger and from Nixon appointees to the Pentagon. It is easy to understand why. Combined with the earlier Defense Department declaration of assets, the study sums to a formidable indictment not of what modern America could become, but of what it is—a Frankenstein, indeed, of military cast.

The facts are indisputable. Two-thirds of all federal taxes are now absorbed by the Pentagon, and, as the *Washington Post* pointed out recently, the Pentagon is spending not only more than the profits of all American business, but also more than federal, state and local governments combined spend for health, education, old age, retirement assistance, housing and agriculture—another point to keep in mind when piously pondering why large areas of the world arm in defense against the U.S.

What makes a dismal picture the more depressing is the perverse effect Vietnam has had on the shading. Before the Johnson escalation, the U.S. was actually trimming down its military presence across the globe. A few years of peace and changing military strategies made possible most of the cutbacks. For instance, the shift in the 1950s from bomber to missile offensive systems enabled the Strategic Air Command to reduce its foreign bases by two-thirds, and allowed the U.S. to shut down large numbers of its radar detection sites against enemy bombers, as many as 250. Nor were the phasing-outs all tactical; there was also a sensitivity to diplomacy and images, at least during the Kennedy and early Johnson years, when

some 59 foreign bases were shut down by former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara.

Vietnam, of course, changed everything. There are now more U.S. servicemen in Vietnam alone than there were deployed all over the world in 1960; in a half-dozen years military spending has almost doubled; finally, no longer is there the inclination to give up voluntarily so much as an inch of military real estate overseas.

In Geneva, representatives of 17 nations are presently grappling with the problem of disarmament. But if the statistics out of Washington tell us anything, it is that some kindred grappling must be done there—for purposes of disarming the Pentagon. The perfect opportunity presents itself with a new administration in the White House and a new budget before the Congress. It is an opportunity missed at the nation's—and world's—peril.

Chicago Voters Tilt

Mayor Daley's Machine

Edward Barrett, the Democratic committeeman for Chicago's 44th Ward, rumbled out of his headquarters only an hour after the polls closed. His organization's man, James Gaughan, had just dropped a City Council runoff election to an independent, William Singer. And now, Barrett, an old man, wouldn't believe the April voting results. "This boy Singer can't be the alderman," he said, and then declared, as though it would cinch his argument, "Why, he even rides around in a car without a vehicle sticker!"

This was Barrett's last word on the election, but the campaign was influenced earlier by another of his mutterings. He tried at one point to ridicule the grooming habits of some of Singer's liberal young precinct workers. "They remind me of a brigade of porcupines," said Barrett. "With the profusion of hair encompassing their entire face and neck, they're porcupines, whose snout is their most predominant feature." Because Singer is Jewish, as are 45 percent of the ward's voters (the previous alderman was Thomas Rosenberg), Barrett's remark was rightly understood to contain an ethnic slur. And so the blunder helped turn out the Jewish precincts to give Singer an edge of about 400 votes out of nearly 25,000 cast.

The 44th Ward runoff grew out of six special elections held this March to fill empty council seats (the next regular city election, for mayor and council, will be in 1971). Richard Daley and his Democratic organization easily carried three of the wards: the 11th, where the Mayor himself is the committeeman; the 14th, where the late alderman was succeeded by his son; and the 32nd, where the boss is Daniel Rostenskowski, Daley's

Congressional leader. None of these wards saw a serious independent campaign.

The Strategy

Independents concentrated instead on winning the other three seats:

Singer, for instance, began his campaign early, raised a lot of money, picked up newspaper and civic endorsements, ran a heavy schedule of appearances, and pushed almost around the clock for three months. He also put together his own precinct network. This was run by some veterans, but most of the troops were political novices. Consequently, they still had large capacity for moral outrage at the routine tactics used by organization people (lies, threats, payoffs, ethnic and religious insults) and therefore worked all the harder.

Gaughan led the March field of four candidates, but failed to get a majority and had to run off against Singer. One of those eliminated in March was the Republican candidate, and he then swung most of his active supporters to Singer. The Cook County Republican chairman also broke precedent by endorsing Singer, and so the campaign for the April election was run as a successful attempt at fusion.

A black independent, Fred Hubbard, knocked off William Dawson's candidate for alderman of the 2nd Ward. Dawson, the ward committeeman, has been Negro boss of the South Side for 30 years and a congressman since 1942. Hubbard ran against the old man in 1966 and got shot before the primary. He recovered, but his campaign didn't, and he lost heavily. He faced a Dawson man in the 1967 council elections, lost narrowly this time, and saw his vote-fraud suit thrown out by the courts. Despite these losses, he had a chance to build an organization, particularly inside the housing projects, where nearly 40 percent of the ward's voters are stacked.

For years, the power of the black regulars has been at the peak of its repute inside the crowded projects. Dawson precinct workers typically get out votes by threatening to kick tenants out of their flats or off welfare. Hubbard, however, got into project politics as a YMCA youth gang worker. He found that the organization, if bucked, often couldn't back up its threats. So he worked the projects thoroughly during the earlier elections, and this time carried all but one of the major public housing precincts.

But he, too, was aided by one of the organization's blunders. The regular candidate was Lawrence Woods, the home secretary to the congressman. Woods was a political protege of Orval Faubus, was indicted for bribery soon after coming to Chicago 10 years ago, and was slow to pay some of his taxes. He also was Dawson's hatchet man and made a lot of enemies inside the organization. He was an unhappy choice.

The organization in the 42nd Ward, the third target

for the independents, also showed poor judgment. This is particularly significant because the committeeman there is George Dunne, president of the Cook County Board and heir apparent to the Mayor. Dunne's candidate ran despite poor health, and spent most of the campaign confined to the hospital. He won, but probably won't be able to serve. Consequently, there is a remote possibility of another special election in the ward before 1971. It could be an embarrassment to Dunne, for the regulars won easily only because the independents split in the March election.

The near-North Side 42nd spans the Gold Coast and a Negro slum, and each area produced an insurgent. The black candidate, John Stevens, nevertheless ran extremely well. He, too, had been a youth worker, although for the city (he was fired the day he filed for office), and knows the streets and projects. He, too, showed the organization it can no longer deliver the public housing precincts as easily as it once did. However, while Ste-

vens' campaign pushed hard, it was accelerated by a lot of black anger. The slums of the 42nd rioted after the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King. They stirred again a year after King's death and a month after the election. The neighborhood was put under a curfew and National Guard patrol a few hours after some kids threw some rocks and bottles. Decisions like this can only help Stevens, since they show Dunne needs an army to control his ward.

The elections strengthen two strains of independent politics: Daley continues to lose the black vote, and comfortable white wards still look for alternatives to the machine. But the figures also show Daley's power among white workers is undamaged. Of the three wards swept by the regulars, two adjoin the Stockyards and the third lies along the industrial belt of the Northwest Side. And these neighborhoods like their mayor. RALPH WHITEHEAD

(Ralph Whitehead is writing a book about Chicago's politics of law and order.)



Dick and Jane in the Pentagon

The Strange World of Mr. Nutter

The Strange World of Ivan Ivanov is not a smuggled-out masterpiece of underground Soviet literature. It is a little book written in Dick-and-Jane prose ("a clear, compelling style" the jacket tells us) which contrasts "the ways of life of average citizens in the Soviet Union and in the United States" and thus "enables us not only to understand Ivan Ivanov's lot, but also to appreciate our own." If that does not firmly establish the work in a genre as native to America as highway billboards and aspirin ads, then a quick glance at the book's sponsors should clinch the matter: *The Strange World* is "the second volume in the Principles of Freedom Series—a series designed to clarify the role of free enterprise in our society." The author expresses his gratitude for the support of something called, with the famed verbal elegance of the legal profession, the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Education About Communism and Its Contrast with Liberty Under Law.

Ah, a genuine specimen of Americana, like the flintlock rifle. And just as antiquated it would seem. Several years ago I heard a grandmotherly delicatessen owner on Morningside Heights argue that life was better in the Soviet Union, as she fixed a mean corned-beef on rye in a most unsubversive fashion. I suspect she is about the only one in the country who could say such things and get a hearing (be-

cause of the corned beef). The idea that proving how bad or good things are under Communism has any real relevance to our estimation of life in the U.S. is strictly mental baggage for those types who consider "If-you-don't-like-it-here-go-to-Russia" to be a smashing rebuttal.

Whatever this book's accuracy in portraying the Strange World of Ivan Ivanov—and I am willing to believe the worst—its real message is the Pleasant World of John Doe. Mr. Doe, for example, "has at his disposal enormously varied sources of news and opinions . . . John may tune in to local radio stations all over the country . . . he may watch at least half a dozen television stations."

Nor should John feel skeptical about his nation's politics: "As anyone familiar with the American political scene knows, each of the two major parties contains a wide spectrum of opinion on political issues. . . . These differences are nowhere more apparent than at the national conventions." Furthermore, "our institutions are designed to prevent concentration of power into the hands of any man or body of men."

Radical militants will be happy to learn that "the Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . is rigidly confined to enforcement of federal laws and the powers of its agents are deliberately circumscribed." And the authors of a recent Carnegie Foundation report

Symposium in Rome:

Is Unbelief Believable?

It was obviously a pleasant surprise to the sponsors when nearly 3,000 spectators appeared at the Great Hall of the Gregorian University in Rome for the opening event of the International Symposium on "The Culture of Unbelief." Perhaps it should not have been so surprising. The well-publicized program consisted of a round-table discussion by a Marxist philosopher (Milan Malhovec of Prague), a Jesuit theologian (Jean Daniélou of Paris, who was made a cardinal a few days later), and a Protestant theologian (myself). The panel which was sponsored by the Vatican Secretariat for Non-Believers was chaired by Cardinal Koenig, the president of the secretariat. It also included remarks by Monsignor Gru-

melli, the secretariat's energetic executive, and Giovanni Agnelli, the Fiat magnate whose foundation picked up the tab. Peter Berger, chairman of the five-day consultation, introduced the panelists. The symbolism of such a panel was, to say the least, intriguing, especially in Rome: Christians and Marxists, Catholics and Protestants, theologians, sociologists and philosophers all exchanging views on "unbelief" under the benevolent auspices of a papal secretariat and paid for by an Italian millionaire. It was a kind of ecumenical Rubicon. No wonder people came.

The consultation itself, though less spectacular, was even more significant. The audience was strictly limited. The participants included some of the best known sociologists of religion in the world (Talcott Parsons, Charles Glock, Thomas Luckmann, Robert Bellah, François Houtart, Thomas O'Dea, and several others), two Marxist students of religion (Mandic of Yugoslavia and Varga of Hungary), a couple of psychologists of religion and some other assorted scholars. Three theologians and one

on the need for extensive scholarship help should have realized that "few able students are denied a college education for lack of funds."

Naturally, a book in a series "designed to clarify the role of free enterprise in our society" cannot fail to impart much wisdom concerning our economic life. We learn, for example, that "within the gigantic market organized by free enterprise, which still dominates our economy, the consumer is sovereign." We learn of the "intense forces of competition that continue to rule," and that "the evidence shows no discernible growth in the extent of monopoly." "The hallmark of our economy is creative diversity." And—who would doubt it?—"private property is simply the other side of the coin to liberty." I would like to quote more insights from this section. Unfortunately the intense forces of competition (which priced this book at \$5 for 140 pages) forgot to print some 16 pages in the middle of my copy.

The author is not without worries about America. For one thing, he feels that freedom is threatened by the Supreme Court's power of judicial review. He fears an ominous growth of executive power. (I too have meditated on this danger but would never have had the perspicacity to detect it, above all, in "an executive order issued in January 1968 regulating certain property rights of American residents in foreign transactions.") There are other areas where "freedom has been curtailed." Minimum-wage laws, for example, which "prescribe the lowest wage for which one may work, a minimum that currently exceeds the average wage in such countries as England." And then there are laws restricting the "maximum hours of work at regular rates of pay." Not

only that! "Almost all Americans are required to purchase old-age insurance, and they must do so through the social security program of the federal government; they are not allowed to substitute equivalent private insurance even though it may be cheaper."

"We have probably gone too far," writes the author, in limiting economic inequalities. "For example, the steeply graduated rates of taxation on higher levels of personal income sharply reduce incentives. . . . The heavy and progressive taxes on corporate income are even more in point. . . ."

Now there is nothing whatsoever noteworthy in the simplisms I have cited. They are typical of a vast library of conservative Cold War literature; and it is probably unfair to lift quotations from the surrounding banalities, which render them even less meaningful. Why, then, waste any attention on *The Strange World of Ivan Ivanov*? Perhaps only because the author, G. Warren Nutter, has just been appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The office, according to a *New Republic* note on Nutter, "formulates Defense Department position on all foreign political and military issues, including arms control and disarmament. It also runs the foreign military assistance and arms sales programs." Previous tenants have been important in promoting the nonproliferation treaty and the Vietnam bombing halt. Mr. Nutter, on the other hand, pronounced against selling wheat to the Russians in 1963, "building bridges" in 1964, and East-West trade in 1967. He was a campaign advisor to Goldwater. The Senate confirmed his appointment without debate.

PETER STEINFELS

church historian also took part—in all about 30.

From the outset it became clear that “unbelief” is a slippery, imprecise and maybe even misleading category. Right away Luckmann, a young West German whose *Invisible Religion* examines the symbols of industrial society, set the tone. He insisted that merely to study unbelief as deviation from an institutionally-defined norm serves no useful purpose, obscures what is really happening to religious belief in the modern world, and imprisons sociology in an ecclesiastically-defined notion of what religious belief is. Robert Bellah argued that “belief,” in the sense of cognitive adherence, is not essential to religion and may even represent a Western rationalist prejudice. He told the gathering he believed religion can and will be reconciled with science in the modern world, but only if religious leaders give up their cognitive bias and instead emphasize faith (“belief in” as Bellah termed it) rather than “belief that.”

The consultants pursued these philosophical issues with such gusto that by the time Charles Glock presented a paper calling for extensive survey-research on the problem of unbelief, many thought the phenomenon was far too subtle for such methods. Some contended that the intensity, relevance and saliency of a person's beliefs are not easily uncovered by most contemporary research methods. Others suggested that “unbelief” is really a complete misnomer since every human being has some belief system, however unorthodox or confused. I told the group that in an age of culture-religion and astrology, hypocrisy and credulity are certainly as important as “unbelief,” if not more so. Chairman Peter Berger finally proposed, only half facetiously, that perhaps we should change the name of the conference from “The Culture of Unbelief” to “The Cultures (plural) of Belief.”

In general, the theologians present experienced real difficulty in making any contribution to the discussion. Grey-haired Henri De Lubac, author of *The Drama of Atheist Humanism*, who sat next to me, seemed bewildered by the talk about theoretical models and survey research. Martin Marty gave a brilliant response to Bellah's paper the second day, but remained uncharacteristically quiet during the remainder of the sessions. The occasion confirmed in my own mind two hunches I have harbored for some time. The first is that the social-scientific study of religion, especially when it departs from more empirical surveys, is today a more important conversation partner for theology than either philosophy or history—especially where social scientists use a phenomenological approach and are aware of the conceptual problems involved in their work. The second confirmed hunch is that very few theologians are equipped to deal with social science on more than a superficial basis. The implications of all this for the future training of theologians is far-reaching, indeed.

Toward the end of the consultation the participants advanced some ideas for further research. Monsignor Gru-

melli expressed the hope that cross-cultural investigations of nonbelief might be undertaken. Cardinal Koenig pronounced the consultation a successful beginning of the secretariat's work. But Signor Agnelli was not on hand to promise unlimited Fiat funds for such a massive and expensive undertaking. (Agnelli in Italian does *not* mean angel.)

Still, further work on the stubborn problem of religion, faith and secularization in the modern world will certainly be done under someone's auspices, and the Rome consultation did prove to be a breakthrough in some respects. Sociologists of religion, who have sometimes been viewed as enemies of the faith by church leaders were welcomed, listened to and even somewhat touted: the conferees were housed near the Borghese garden in the snazzy Parco dei Principi, pursued by the Roman *paparazzi* and entertained by Italian nobility. The consultation received attention from the Italian press unparalleled for a “religious event” since *Humanae Vitae*. Some sociologists vaguely suspected it might be the curial equivalent of the Russian bear's hug, but most relaxed and enjoyed being ravished.

On the last day Pope Paul VI received the entire consultation in a private audience. The Pope, looking weak and frail, welcomed the delegation warmly and praised the work of the consultation. He even said, for the first time to my knowledge, that secularization is not a totally negative process, and that all men are in some ways unbelievers. He expressed his confidence that science and religion need not oppose each other and told the group he hoped their work would continue.

As the participants packed to leave Rome, spring was touching the Borghese Gardens and I was hopeful. What if, not under Paul VI perhaps, but under an eminent successor, the Eternal City would become a gathering place for those to whom John XXIII had addressed *Pacem in Terris*—all men of good will? What if it could provide a splendid focus for a discussion among the various “cultures of belief”? What if the encyclicals could be written by morally sensitive men of many religious and secular backgrounds instead of by curial reactionaries? What if the Pope could begin to symbolize, as John XXIII began to, the common hopes and concerns of the whole human species?

I left Rome with a feeling that only if something like this happens will the Roman Church ever become authentically “catholic.” The possibility is there. When or whether it will happen remains now only a fascinating speculation. But if it does not, I am convinced that in not too many decades, the Basilica of St. Peter will join the Coliseum and the Temple of Fortuna as one more empty monument to a religion that could not respond in faith to the challenge of the times.

HARVEY COX

(Harvard Divinity professor Harvey Cox, author of *The Secular City*, writes a regular column on culture and religion for *Commonweal*.)

THE MYTH OF THE JURY TRIAL



Pleading guilty out of self-defense

GERALD L. HALLWORTH



Through the years, one of the benevolent *a priori*'s of the American way has been trial by jury for the accused. However, there are large myths at work. The system has built-in flaws, such as the allowances it makes for plea-bargaining and by-passing of trial, so that not infrequently the rights of defendant or public, or both, are on balance nicked by the processes of criminal justice. The James Earl Ray "trial" in Memphis last March may or may not have been a case in point, but it did dramatize many of the problems.

Historically in America most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights that deal with protection of those accused of criminal conduct were meant to be applied to the conduct of a criminal trial. Such things as representation by an attorney, trial by jury, self-incrimination right, and the ban on cruel and unusual punishment were designed to afford the alleged criminal offender a certain degree of protection against arbitrary judicial activity. The sum of it adds to the spectacle of verbal combat we call a trial, two attorneys pursuing their respective clients' interests with enthusiasm and consummate skill, the zealousness of the attorneys held in check by an impartial arbiter who upholds and demands adherence to a prescribed set of elaborate rules. In traditional folklore, the result of the battle, the ending of "fact" or "truth," is accomplished by a jury composed of a cross-section of the specific geographical society from which the jury members were selected.

Central to this system of justice, proudly known as the adversary system, has been the long held and established belief that the truth will emerge best from a combative situation. In fact the great accolades of the modern

folklore are reserved for those attorneys who are associated with trial work—F. Lee Bailey, Louis Nizer, Jake Elrich, Melvin Belli and Percy Foreman are examples.

However, and to make what is perhaps a rash assumption, if there has ever been a golden age of jury trials for those who have been accused of violating society's criminal statutes, that age surely has passed. It has been replaced by an era where 90 percent of those accused by formal judicial action of committing a serious crime are not convicted by a jury of their peers or what passes for peers in our day. Ninety percent of all those who are convicted of a serious offense in the United States are convicted and sentenced following a brief appearance in a courtroom where they have pleaded guilty to the offense for which they have been charged.

In other words, the historical reasons that called forth the procedural protections for those accused by the state of criminal activity are not relevant in the modern context of the administration of criminal justice. The overwhelming majority of alleged violators simply do not reach the point where the formal guarantees of the courtroom have any meaning. It is in this modern context—conviction without jury trial—that the Supreme Court's activity must be understood and weighed. The point that is to be made can be illustrated through a closer examination, from this realistic perspective, of the highly controversial *Miranda v. Arizona* decision.

In *Miranda*, the Supreme Court set down guidelines for interrogation of suspected criminal offenders that require the adherence of law enforcement officers. The failure to comply means that any conviction might be placed in serious jeopardy. The Court said that at the moment a suspect was arrested the police had to (1) warn the suspect that he had a right to be silent and if he said any-

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thing it would be used against him, (2) that the suspect must be informed that he had a right to have an attorney present for all interrogations, and (3) if the suspect could not afford to hire his own attorney, a lawyer would be appointed for him. Additionally, the police were advised that any interrogation of the suspect had to cease whenever, in whatever manner, the suspect indicated that he no longer wished to be questioned.

The hue and cry against the decision has not diminished to this time. However, what is suggested here is that most of those speaking against the decision have labored under a misapprehension of the administration of criminal justice. The myth of the trial has been the "unarticulated premise" of their arguments. In effect, they have argued that the Court is "coddling" criminals because if the police were left alone the "ultimate truth" of the affair would emerge at a later impartial trial where both sides would be able to present their evidence and a jury would then be able to ascertain accurately the truth. If this was the truth of the administration of criminal justice there would be great merit to the argument. But the administration of American criminal justice does not operate in the folklore fashion. And because the system does not operate in the folklore fashion as is presumed, the necessity for *Miranda* becomes increasingly clear.

Plea-Bargaining

The facts of the process are reasonably well-researched, and two items have great importance. First, about one-half of those people arrested by the police for serious offenses *never* stand trial. The prosecutor or the police release the individuals from custody without a formal judicial accusation being brought against the suspects. The remainder are either indicted by a grand jury for the offense or they are bound over for trial on a prosecutor's bill of information. Of this group of approximately 50 percent, 90 percent never stand trial. A jury never determines the facts. In actuality, an opposing set of facts to those presumed by the prosecutor is never permitted to become a part of the record. The process that ends with a guilty plea in a courtroom and subsequent punishment has been a largely invisible process that has come under increasing attention by many researchers in the last several years. The name given to this low visibility process is plea-bargaining or plea-negotiation.

The usual result of plea-bargaining is that the suspect eventually agrees to plead guilty to a lesser offense than that for which he was arrested. In exchange for the guilty plea, the prosecutor agrees to recommend a particular sentence to the judge who will receive the guilty plea. And though the prosecutor cannot guarantee to the suspect that the judge will accept the recommendation, he knows full well that in the overwhelming majority of incidents the judge will accept the recommendation because the judge knows as well as the prosecutor that the


American criminal judiciary would cease to function if a larger percentage of those charged with a crime were to demand the trial rights that are guaranteed to them either under the United States Constitution or the constitutions of the various states. Our judicial structure, due to many reasons—lack of physical facilities and personnel are basic—is simply not geared to meeting a wholesale demand for personal procedural rights. Further compounding the difficulty of this aspect of criminal justice is the fact that the procedure rests on a *lie*. In most localities the judge inquires of the suspect whether or not his guilty plea has been conditioned by the promise of reward or the threat of punishment. The accused inevitably responds that his guilty plea is completely voluntary and that future actions were neither threatened nor promised in exchange for the plea. Interestingly enough at this point the accused, the prosecutor, and the judge *all know* that the suspect is lying. It is known that at a minimum the suspect has been given an implicit and sometimes explicit promise of reduced penalty in exchange for the guilty plea. But there is more wrong with the system than the mere fact that the guilty plea rests on a lie.

In view of the overcrowded nature of most of our criminal courts today (a 40,000-case backlog in New York City and at one time last year almost a year's backlog in Washington, D.C.), it would seem that the guilty plea, despite the fact that it is usually based on perjured testimony, does perform a useful function in the administration of criminal justice. Useful yes, but how well is justice served? Not only for the defendant but for society as well. Does society get a fair shake from the guilty plea? Is society protected by use of the perjured testimony or is society's only reward a shortened court docket? Society gets short-changed on at least two counts in the plea-bargaining process.

One, due to the pressures exerted to gain a guilty plea, a prosecutor operates with little information other than what is available in the local police files on a particular suspect. Perhaps the suspect should not be allowed to plead guilty to a reduced charge for a reduced sentence. Perhaps the individual in custody poses a real threat to society. The early release from jail or a suspended sentence might mean, and sometimes does mean, that at some future point in time individuals, whose only crime is to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, will suffer because the prosecutor's decision to negotiate was made with insufficient information about the future proclivities and potential of the suspect to do real harm.

Two, society suffers because the "truth" may or may not emerge from the bargaining process. And the ostensible purpose of the judicial aspects of the administration of criminal justice is to develop the truth. In a jury trial the members of the panel are presented with differing "facts" and differing views of similar "facts." Through this clash of factual evidence and clash of interpretation of admitted evidence, the jury, it is assumed, is able to

find the "truth" of the situation. Quite obviously this does not occur if the individual pleads guilty to the charge. For with the waiver of the jury trial and the guilty plea, the prosecutor's set of "facts" goes unchallenged and is accepted as the "truth." Society is presented with a *fait accompli* that is buttressed with only one side to what almost always is a many-sided incident. The "truth" has little opportunity to be known. The prosecutor's unchallenged presentation is accepted as gospel. Surely if the jury trial has as its prime purpose the discovery of truth and if that purpose is premised on the belief that the truth best will emerge from a clash of views, then the plea-bargaining that goes on incessantly in the offices, cells and courtrooms of our country performs a grave disservice to the community-at-large as that community is never able to determine the "truth."



Of course, there are other considerations involved here than society's right to be as free as possible from dangerous persons. These other considerations revolve around a concern for the individual caught up in the machinery of criminal justice. Here, as in the societal viewpoint, there seem to be two major factors to be considered.

One, the individual is not only unaware of the state's case against him but he has little ability to discover any of its content. The usual individual charged with a crime is not well-educated and he lacks sophistication. His mental prowess is nowhere near the capacities of the most doltish of prosecutors. He lacks the general education, the technical education, and the verbal abilities of the man who tells him that "it would be better" if he pleads guilty to the suggested charge reduction. This fact of life is of course even more impelling in its logical conclusions when the first offender is brought into view. The first-fallen is usually unaware of even his basic rights as a "person" in the United States. After he runs through the mill of criminal justice a couple of times the exceptional individual may become as skilled as the most inept prosecutor, but he still has neither the facilities nor the capacities to cope with the average prosecuting attorney whose educational achievements and work experiences vastly exceed those who are charged with criminal offenses. In short, it is an unequal bargaining session.

Two, and perhaps most important, the suspect is in no position, regardless of his knowledge, to weigh with any

degree of objectivity his chances in a trial by jury procedure. The old saying about lawyers who represent themselves are representing fools is a verity. And it is so because the necessary degree of objectivity is missing from the lawyer's examination of the case. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to be objective when portions or all of one's life is hanging in the balance. Emotion overcomes the mind and the rational nature of man succumbs to the threat of the moment and is unable to move beyond the confines of the current situation and assess the future implications of another course of action. In plea-bargaining the suspect is unable to enter into the agreement with any understanding of what is at stake or what the alternatives to a given or prescribed course of action might entail.

How does the decision in *Miranda* overcome these problems? The short of it is that *Miranda* does not overcome all of the inherent biases and difficulties in the plea-negotiating process. *Miranda*, however, does mitigate against them. *Miranda* moves the basic protections afforded by the Bill of Rights from the area of courtroom battle to the interrogation process, where, in fact, the administration of criminal justice is carried out currently. *Miranda* does not mean that every man will be defended by a Perry Mason or a Judd as he undergoes his interrogation, but it does mean that more information about the crime, the individual, and the state's knowledge of the crime will have a greater opportunity to emerge.

For society, the decision means that we will reduce the chances of turning an undesirable back into and onto society. And, we must never forget that despite all of our psychological, sociological, and psychiatric advances towards rehabilitation, there are people in our society who should not be allowed to prey on other members of the community. Through a mutual exchange of information, and it is not suggested that the exchange will be complete or even cooperative, about the crime and the individual, society will gain much more information and the prosecutor will be able to make a more reasoned judgment as to the desirability of a reduced charge or a suspended sentence recommendation.

Obviously a confrontation of two attorneys on a given issue will allow a better opportunity for the truth to emerge. It will, that is, if the premise of clashing views and its relationship to truth emergence has validity. The attorney for the suspect knows full well of his obligation to defend his client by every fair and legal means possible. This means that the attorney will be able to bring another dimension to bear on the prosecutor's facts. Undoubtedly a greater understanding of the "truth" has a better opportunity to emerge from a plea-negotiating process that features two attorneys in dialogue or discussion than it would if the inequalities of the pre-*Miranda* days were to be perpetuated.

The advantages of the *Miranda* rule for the individual caught up in the criminal machinery are as obvious as

the advantages for society. The individual charged with a criminal offense will have the benefit of an "expert" who can weigh the arguments and presentation of the prosecutor from a stronger general and technical knowledge base. The need for attorney representation in the plea-bargaining stage of criminal law is even more pronounced when we consider the first offender. Commonly this is a poorly educated individual who is frightened by the circumstances he finds himself in and is all but totally unaware of his basic rights as a human being.

In the pre-*Miranda* stage of plea-negotiating the first offender was hustled through the interrogation process, generally falling victim to one of the many sophisticated techniques of police interrogation, and ultimately accepting the prosecutor's recommendation that he plead guilty. It was only later that the individual became aware of what had happened to him. His new awareness added to the totality of circumstances which brought him to the point of criminal action in the first place. The procedure could only harden the individual and make him even more suspect of society. His chances for returning to criminal activity were vastly increased and society's rules and activities not only started him on the road to a life of crime, but at his first contact with the legal forces of the society he was taught that the community could not be trusted because the community did not believe in a "fair shake" for all of its members. It would seem that the *Miranda* rule as applied to first-offenders would give that individual a greater feeling of well-being towards society and perhaps buoy any faint hope that society can and does act fairly. Such a feeling can only redound to the community's benefit as it would reduce the chances for recidivism. If our penal system is not to punish (perhaps this is just another myth) then surely the first offender should be our special concern.

The individual will benefit likewise from the presence in the interrogation room of the "expert" whose familiarity with the local judicial and law enforcement scene far exceeds that of the suspect's. Because of his experience, the lawyer has more knowledge of the alternatives available and will be in a stronger position to weigh the various advantages and disadvantages of each. When the mind is freed from the emotion of being forced to think of the dangers immediately present, a higher degree of rationality and objectivity can be obtained in the weighing of possible alternative courses of action. The attorney representing the accused or suspect in the plea-negotiating stage will not have to be concerned about his own loss of freedom. Thus he will be able to weigh the alternate paths available to the accused with more objectivity than would the man whose rational being is submerged under the specter of physical confinement and isolation from the remainder of society for an undetermined number of years.

While *Miranda* has made a great contribution to the preservation of basic procedural guarantees in a setting

unknown to those who wrote the guarantees in the first place, the task is not yet finished. Though it be true that *Miranda* has placed the procedural guarantees in a setting where those guarantees have more meaning and are more viable, the problems with the plea-negotiation process are not yet finished.

Society must face up to the realities of the administration of criminal justice in the United States. Society must be made aware that the image that is created by sensational trials, such as the Sirhan trial, is not the general picture of the reality of criminal law. In fact the sensational trial is a cruel deception of the usual criminal case. Society must learn of the real process and then it must demand that the process no longer be premised on an official lie. We cannot afford to delude ourselves that the system's realities bear close resemblance to the myth of the jury trial. Perhaps more importantly we no longer can allow ourselves the hypocrisy of accepting a known falsehood as a statement of truth.

Society has a right to know the ingredients of the negotiated plea. The terms of the "deal"—and it is a *deal*—must be known. The terms must be set down in writing and made a part of the public record for all who care to see and examine. But these last things are things that no Supreme Court can achieve. They must come from societal action. The "good citizens" must demand that our administration of criminal justice be dressed up in truth, honesty, and visibility. As long as the process is predicated on a lie and is cloaked with invisibility we cannot begin to achieve "justice for all."



HAROLD WITT

GYPSIES

Someone who looks like a gypsy is burning the leaves
behind the fluttering poplars across the canyon,
in the blue smoke, in a red bandana and jeans,
as a wind slants the trees, and tans and yellows blow
down.

Over the hill the freeway purrs with its speed
and the jets tear through rainy air toward important
places;
if gypsies exist, they're camped in some other era—
bright carts in dark woods, with fire on earringed faces,

and nowhere near here-and-now's leaf-burning suburb,
but someone who looks like a gypsy is burning the leaves,
and the smoke twists up through the trees as from gypsy
campfire—

whatever is true up close, this distance deceives

and the red bandana suggests much more than is seen
in the smoke from the leaves and the dog that visibly
barks

before the noise of its joy, through what's between,
comes to light from such old gypsy darks.

THE MAN IN THE CUTAWAY SUIT

LEO R. WARD



WAS there ever a man farther away than the priest at our altar? His Sunday clothes, and his movements so different from ours when we were pitching hay, removed him miles from us. Up three or four steps above the sanctuary floor, and this three steps above us, and himself talking to himself in a code—all this took him out of our world. An entry found long afterward in a daybook downtown making the priest liable for fifteen cents shows that the priest's house like anybody else's had mice in it. If we had just known!

I suppose that most children were afraid of him. This was not on account of harsh words thrown at us; most Irish-born priests brought with them the habit of standing apart from children and disregarding them, and I was surprised when my sister told me that Father O'Riley called her "Yellow Curls" at catechism and that on sunshiny afternoons he and the Methodist minister used to stand visiting and whittling halfway between their churches. "What do you think they talked about?" I am sure it was the weather and the price of hogs, matters that concerned everybody and were not overly divisive.

Where they met was really the parting of the ways, and at that spot the team on the hearse once balked, because, people said, the deceased should be a Catholic, and a cautious man said "I don't know did it happen. I thought I'd take the driver apart some day and ask him if he had to whip the team to get them to turn."

Whatever about the preacher, the priest was away off somewhere, in Ireland or Rome or it could be halfway up to heaven. Not like any of us at all, he was not even

Father O'Riley or "a priest," he was "the priest" and much like an institution.

Father Cadden, our town's first pastor, though Irish-born and trained, may have been closer to the people. He had a farm of his own, for generations called—children had no notion why—the Father Cadden place; it was improved and all under the plow, but the house, catalpas in front of it, was empty and ghost-looking. When this man was "t 'ome" one summer he bundled up a niece and brought her back with him, and she surely was the delight of his house and the parish, since she was a charming woman in her later years.

I was eight when our neighbor the old lady Caveny died, and on a summer day that seemed to say it would always be summer, Father O'Riley, a slender little man in a cutaway coat, came to the wake in the loghouse. I suppose the priest led the Rosary in the one room where the family lived and died, and no doubt people knelt on the grass outside. But I don't remember prayers or people, for what was an old dead woman to me? What I remember is that the priest talked to my mother and asked how many children she had, and his ordinary question in ordinary language surprised me, for I expected his words to be formal and mechanical (though talking machines had not reached the parish). When she said the baby in his arms made seven, he said she would have more and she said no and laughed.

I had often seen this stranger the priest, but this was the first time he ever seemed close, standing there in the dead woman's yard under maples and a Siberian crab-tree and the flowing spring. I still think my mother must have been remarkable to be able to talk in a casual way to the priest.

Then one day we heard the strange news that the priest was sick. How could things like that be at all? Then at school on an autumn day a big boy speaking in a hush-hush tone as if he possessed secrets from the foundation of the universe said that the priest was dead. (Just ten years he was with us; only forty-three, he had been a builder and debt-payer.) The priest dead—I had not been brought up to grasp those words. Yet we were used to death among chickens and young turkeys and half-starved old cows. I think part of my trouble was the mysterious way of that boy reporter as if he was planets beyond us, and I recall that once he brought to school two whole pencils, sharpened to a point, and pencils cost a penny apiece.

More grown up, but not knowing how to salute the priest, I disappointed my mother one day. I knew I should touch my hat, but—well, wasn't this something outside

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our ordinary lives? We were trotting down a hill toward town, the team pushed by a wagonload of produce, and the new priest was coming up the hill driving the most daredevil team to appear in open daylight. He lifted his dude hat, also called a hard hat, in what seemed to farmers the most elegant fashion, and my mother's voice was so reproachful, "Why didn't you tip your hat to the priest?" With his horses kicking up the dust and our team lumbering down the hill, I was terribly self-conscious at being expected to doff the hat, as the saying went, and it an everyday farmer's straw. A defeated boy of thirteen, I felt miserable and mean and must have looked as done in as the old hat. The gay equipage was gone, but the business of doffing a farmer's sombrero remained.

We were not mystics and probably were too literal and looked up too little to the sky. Our one mystic was a tall blackbearded skinny man who went up and down the roads afoot selling patent medicines for people and horses and then hiding in a shack made of jackoak lumber. All the same, on October 10, 1911 our skinny man ran a bill for

"goggles	.25
love poems	.75"

One day this holy man sold some nostrum to a blacksmith named Dukes, who never kept a book and must have most of his wages still coming to him. Stopping to collect, the mystic said the bill was thirty-seven and a half cents; he fingered the thirty-seven shelled out to him and said more was due, and Dukes smashed a penny on the anvil: "There, take your damn half penny!" The two men are buried close together, facing the church and not far from the priest.

Everybody flocked to "the mission" in late September before men had to be husking corn and after the molasses was out of the way, for molasses and the mission could not be made together. With the kit and caboodle of us, our parents always attended, yet coming home at nine p.m., they must have known that the mission went over our heads. Of course, no one missed in favor of pigs or corn, and people said that a town woman lived in the church for the duration. Only a few words out of the many vigorously spoken, stayed with me. One preacher said that a man could pray when he was plowing and a woman when tending the baby. "Pray always"—that made sense. To scare us in face of the "four last things," a preacher said that a certain farmer was too busy to go to Mass; the man set out for Hayworden and he never reached Hayworden; this funny name for a town was said over and over, and instead of being impressed by the moral, we got fun out of the name. "Hayworden, I have to go to Hayworden."

We took God to be everywhere, in fields and lots and houses and wakes. But confirmed and all, I was taken back when a girl of my age and her little brother said: "You know the Memorare, don't you?" To know meant



to have it by heart and to have said it every day time out of mind. I was too proud and cowardly to say I did not know it: in fact, I had never heard the word. And the warmth and intimacy with which they talked about it, and they didn't go to church every Sunday, either; but of course they didn't always have a way or the clothes.

Busy as we all were, our father was a kind of priest and our mother a kind of Holy Mary Mother of God, so that like as we would we were on our knees every night in the kitchen. We had to be. Fourth of July, Christmas—it was all the same, or a scorching day in the fields: "Wash your feet and say your prayers and get to bed!" They did not see life short of God, it was as if God was hovering over us and we were to grow up in the love and fear of the Lord. In Ireland, people say: "God's help is nearer than the door." We knew this, but we also knew that we had to keep the lines of communication open.

DURING Lent we said the beads seven nights a week, let us see any laggard get out of it. It was no use saying we had been to Mass and were going skating. First things first. Our mother would be reaching to the nearest: "Here take the beads and get started." The ten-minute stint could seem like an hour. By the priest's leave, she would be sitting in a rocker that had been many times repaired by the head of the house, and, the last Hail Mary said, he would break out: "We fly to thy patronage, O Holy Mother of God, despise not our petitions in our necessities, but deliver us from all dangers, O glorious and ever virgin Mary!" He knelt, the elbows of his strong and many-missioned arms on a chair and his bony face resting in calloused hands. It was as if for a brief moment he wanted to shut out the sun and rain, the pigs and the plow.

We often heard those Latinish words, but I wonder what they could have meant even to him, a mere lay priest. He was always uncomfortable in saying "truth" which a farmer might have occasion to say every few

days and "Massachusetts" which he might have to stumble through every few years. But take the prelude to the Litany: "thy patronage"—here were words he did not use around the house or in the cornfield. And how does one fly to patronage? "Despise not in our necessities"—these words were taking off in strange directions. As if catching his breath in the prelude, he was at home in the invocations which he had by heart. When he was away at a raffle or a wake, we worked our way through, and if a neighbor died, down on our knees, all of us, for beads and Litany. Ma was the best to lead because her fat fingers slipped over some of the Hail Marys.

Grace at meals seemed to us a Protestant piousism, as if a preacher was in the house; it was "their" prayer, not ours. At least for me, this was because when Protestants threshed, the man would "return thanks" and he might be pretty long about it, all of us waiting for the grub. But at the word of "pray always" we took up the custom, though we sat at our grace, I think to avoid feeling Protestant.

Most of a century in "our" community, we no longer paid much attention to Protestants unless to tolerate some and look down on others. In the Irish saying, it was we who turned the wheel.

On a deadly hot Sunday the priest's homily was well received: "You have been to church. Go home and save your grain. Don't let a hail destroy it." But I am sure that doing field work on Sunday left our family and many a family a trifle upset and feeling that things were not just right. It did me and my father and mother, let the priest say what he would. It was all right to play ball and go swimming or hunting and slop pigs and harness horses. But to dance or do unnecessary servile work was another matter.

Once when we were cutting oats on Sunday I remember how different was the tone of my father as he stopped at the top of a hill, not to worship, but to let the horses "blow." Two of those faithful plugs had taken us to Mass that morning, but was it right for them to help pull a binder on Sunday? Like my father I was conscious that cutting oats on Sunday was different than cutting oats on a weekday, and the women folks getting supper were conscious that the men were cutting oats on Sunday. The priest speaking from the altar could not reduce Sunday to a weekday. Cutting oats one day or another, we stood more under the Lord's judgment than under the priest's. There was a limit to the things the man in the black cutaway could change.

The thin crop had to be saved. That was clear, and the priest had the good sense to say to go and save it. Both our people and the more or less godly outsiders said the same. Still, something about it, a feeling, a hitch, a catch away down in a man, a woman, even a child. "Say your prayers and have a good night's sleep and tomorrow will be almost like any day."

Public Schools Feel The Money Pinch

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WILLIAM R. GRANT

This steel-milling town could be a textbook example of the problems of America's cities—the exodus of whites to the suburbs and consequent high concentration of Negroes in the inner city, the decline of the downtown area and resultant drop in the city's tax base, the increasing burden on the city's services created by the poor, the aged, the deprived. Now Youngstown is the first major city to face head-on another dilemma that seems certain to face hundreds more cities in the next few years—bankruptcy of the school system.

Forbidden by state law from using deficit financing, Youngstown closed its schools during December when funds for the year had been spent. Though the schools did open again Jan. 2, the entire tax income for 1969 may be spent by the time schools close in June. If so, Youngstown's schools may not open at all in the fall.

It is a bitter problem for the city that was once the home of William Holmes McGuffey, father of the "McGuffey Reader." It was not a problem that developed overnight, however. Plagued by labor troubles, uneasy relations between the school board and the community and an increasing number of Negro and Puerto Rican students who need special—and expensive—programs, the Youngstown schools have been caught in a severe political and financial bind. One result is that six times in the last two years the city's voters have rejected proposals to increase their property taxes to provide the schools with enough money to operate.

In Champaign, Ill., teachers are being paid with vouchers, which local banks have agreed to cash on the assumption that the school districts eventually will sell enough bonds to redeem them. In Chicago, school revenue is expected to fall \$48 million short of minimum school needs this year, and Superintendent James Redmond has said he may have to cut the teaching staff by one-fourth in the fall. Detroit, which has had a particularly bitter school-financing history, may be forced to put elementary schools on double sessions in the fall unless the State Legislature is willing to pay more of the city's education bills. Detroit voters last November turned down a \$10-million property tax increase that would have averted the crisis.

The extent of this taxpayer revolt is nationwide. In the last decade U.S. voters have passed about 75 percent of

(Continued on page 170)

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the school issues put to them. In November only 45 percent were approved. The massive rejection stems from many sources. With government bureaucracy growing in all areas, school issues are among the few on which voters still have direct control at the polls. With taxes at all levels straining most family budgets, voters are reluctant to increase their tax bills, no matter what the cause.

There is also an increasing resentment among voters to what many consider the "frills" of education—usually white resentment against special programs for the culturally deprived, chiefly black. Blue-collar voters, in particular, object that teachers' salaries—the biggest cost item in school budgets—are rising too rapidly. "The going pay rate around here is \$2 an hour, and people work hard for their money," comments Gino Lucchesi, who runs an oil and gas distributing business in Adams Township in Michigan's Upper Peninsula. "Many folks here can't see why they should have to pay higher taxes so a young girl just out of college can get \$6,000 a year instead of \$5,628 to start teaching school." Schools there opened two weeks late last fall after the superintendent and school board resigned when caught between demands for higher salaries and voters' refusal to pass higher taxes.

In some states the election process itself creates additional snags for school-finance proposals. Last November in Seattle, where passage requires 60 percent approval (including 40 percent of the voters in the last general election) voters failed to approve a tax levy by only one percent.

Pressures converge especially in urban areas, which usually have less money to spend on each student than adjacent suburban regions. A 1964-65 Carnegie Foundation study found that schools in the nation's 37 largest cities had \$121 per student less to spend than did suburban districts. Further, the gap is widening rather than closing. Two years previously the Foundation had found a difference of only \$62 per student.

Last year the Detroit schools spent only \$600 a student, while predominantly white suburban Grosse Pointe spent about \$900. The all-Negro Willowbrook district near Watts in Los Angeles spent about \$613 per student last year. In posh Beverly Hills the per-student expenditure was \$1,017.

This is a sharp departure from recent history, when the cities were the rich school districts of the nation, with money for special programs and high quality staffs. But in the course of 20 years all that has changed. Cities have not become suddenly poor; indeed, their wealth has been increased. This wealth is primarily in private hands, however, and the power to tax it rests largely with the state. Already the city has the highest tax rate in the metropolitan area. In 1966 New York City residents, for example, paid \$44.26 per \$1,000 property value as com-

pared to \$21.83 per \$1,000 for four suburban counties.

State legislatures have taken little action to alleviate the financial dilemmas of city schools, although greatly increased state aid may be the only salvation of the urban schools. Portland, Ore., educates 17 percent of the state's children but gets only 12.5 percent of the state's allotment for public schools. Even in states like Illinois and Michigan, where the aid formula favors the urban districts, the state is still far from equalizing opportunity.

Underlying the argument for greater financial support of urban schools by the state is the concept that money ought to be given out on the basis of what is needed to provide a decent education to all students. This premise is being tested in suits filed by the Detroit Board of Education and by a group of ghetto parents in Chicago. These suits could result in a Supreme Court decision requiring states to provide equal educational opportunity to all students, regardless of comparative cost. If so, the decision could have an effect on education "comparable in its significance to the Supreme Court's 1954 decision on desegregation," commented Howard Howe II, former U.S. Commissioner of Education.

The idea that more money will solve most of the problems of education has not been tested. But, argues Dr. Laverne Cunningham, the education dean of Ohio State U., "we have expected children to learn on a modest level of expenses, and we know that's not working."

Money is not the panacea for all that plagues American education, but lack of money has caused many crucial problems to be ignored for too long. A broader tax base and more equitable state aid may be the beginning of a solution, but with so many state governments stacked against the urban areas and minority groups, state programs are unlikely to end the troubles. The remedy may eventually have to come on a national level.

One thing, however, seems certain—without a speedy, wide-ranging aid to troubled urban schools Youngstown may be the norm and not an isolated example.

CRITICAL MEDLEY



RECORDS

The Berlioz centenary has brought us the articles rehashing the old myths about the gifted but self-taught and undisciplined composer who embodied his personal extravagance in the extravagances of his music, and who originated striking orchestral colors and effects but only occasionally—as Harold Schonberg put it in his *Times Magazine* article—"could come up with an inspired tune." And it has brought us performances and recordings of the music that has contradicted these myths in vain for 150 years—the music of the genius whose originality of mind survived his thorough formal musical

WILLIAM R. GRANT is on the staff of the Detroit Free Press, specializing in writing on education.

education at the Paris Conservatoire, and whose powers operated with the discipline required to produce the exquisitely fashioned writing of the symphony *Romeo and Juliet*: the enchantment of Capulet's garden at night achieved with quiet strings and flutes and a few notes of a distant horn; the flow of heart-piercingly lovely melody in the Love Scene; the delicate orchestral magic of the Queen Mab scherzo. Until now there have been available on records two ineffectively paced and otherwise poor performances of the work conducted by Munch (RCA Victor) and Monteux (Westminster) and the superb performance broadcast by Toscanini in 1947 (RCA Victor). But now Philips has issued one by Colin Davis with the London Symphony which, though different from Toscanini's in pacing and shaping, ranks with his in quality and effectiveness, and has the advantage over his of being reproduced with greater beauty and clarity of sound—the clarity, for example, of the chorus of young Capulets after the ball, as against its indistinctness in the Toscanini performance. But imbalance in the recording of chorus and orchestra destroys the effect, in the new performance, of one of the most extraordinary sections of the work, Juliet's Funeral Procession. In Toscanini's performance one hears with the orchestra's somber fugal march the recurring plaintive exclamation of the chorus on the note E; and later, when the chorus takes over the fugal march, one hears the plaintive E's played now by the violins. But in Davis' performances the chorus's recurring exclamation, in the first part, each time obliterates the orchestra's fugal march, and the chorus's fugal march, in the second part, obliterates the violins' plaintive E's.

Verdi is another composer who has been condescended to in the face of the powers impressively manifested in earlier operas like *Macbeth* and *Il Trovatore* and the matured art operating incandescently in the beautiful style of the last operas and the *Requiem*. Of the *Requiem* too there has been until now on records no performance comparable with Toscanini's; but now London has issued one conducted by Solti whose pacing and shaping produce a mostly satisfying statement of the work, with only a few flaws like the melodramatic accents Solti adds to the chorus's whispered "*Dies irae*" and "*Rex tremendae majestatis*," and his crude slowing down for the last climax of the *Libera me*. With the excellent work of the Vienna Philharmonic and State Opera Chorus the performance offers superb singing by the mezzo-soprano Marilyn Horne and the bass Martti Talvela; good singing by the rather dry-voiced tenor Luciano Pavarotti; and singing by the soprano Joan Sutherland which is very fine in the earlier parts of the work that require of her what she does best—the effortless sustained high notes that are the most attractive her voice produces. In the concluding *Libera me*, on the other hand, one hears more of the unattractive lower range of her voice.

Philips has reissued on low-priced World Series rec-

ords the excellent performance conducted by Rosbaud of the later French version of Gluck's opera *Orpheus and Euridice*, with its lovely additional numbers, and with the title role sung by a tenor—in this performance Leopold Simoneau, whose voice is exceptionally beautiful. There is also lovely singing by the sopranos Suzanne Danco and Pierette Alarié; and the pseudo-stereo sound is good.

As for instrumental music, a Westminster record offers the Allegri Quartet's moderately good performance of Mozart's Quartet K.499, whose opening movement—characteristic in its mingled poignant loveliness, grace and wit—is one of the high points in his writing for the medium; and an even better performance of Beethoven's Op. 18 No. 1, which has a slow movement that one is amazed to hear in so early a work.

A low-priced Turnabout record has Peter Frankl's excellent performances of Chopin's four Ballades, the first and last of which are two of his greatest pieces, and his Fantasy Op. 49, a work of the same stature.

One of the best of Schubert's pieces for piano four hands, the Fantasy Op. 103, with its especially lovely and poignant opening section that returns at the end, is performed well by Badura-Skoda and Demus on a Westminster record, which has also Schubert's charming but excessively long Grand Rondo Op. 107, his engaging earlier Rondo Op. 138, and Mozart's rather mechanical Andante with Variations K.501.

The impressively gifted young Claudio Abbado conducts the London Symphony in a performance of Mendelssohn's delightful *Italian* Symphony that can be faulted only for its second movement played much more slowly than the Andante con moto Mendelssohn prescribes. The reverse side of the London record has an excellent performance of Mendelssohn's *Scotch* Symphony, of which the second and fourth movements are very engaging, the other two less interesting.

Szell conducts his superb Cleveland Orchestra in effective performances of Dvořák's Slavonic Dances, which he manages to get onto one Columbia record by omitting some repeats.

But it is a less familiar work of Dvořák, his Symphonic Variations Op. 78—excellently performed by Colin Davis with the London Symphony on a Philips record—that provides a more impressive demonstration of his flow of lovely melodic, harmonic and instrumental invention.

B. H. HAGGIN

We regret that due to the pressure of space we have been unable to present B. H. Haggin's records column on the regular basis we had originally planned. For that reason the column by Mr. Haggin in this issue will be the last in our pages. We are grateful to him for his contributions to the magazine since October, 1967.

—THE EDITORS

THE SCREEN

Perhaps the most amazing thing about the movie version of "Goodbye, Columbus" is its faithfulness to Philip Roth's fine novella. Much of the dialogue seems to be lifted right from the book into Arnold Schulman's lively screenplay—and very amusing dialogue it is, as it fits so patly into this summer romance between a Jewish boy of limited income and a Jewish girl whose *nouveau riche* parents are loaded. It is a touching story and at times a very funny movie that should give a great deal of pleasure to audiences who don't find the bedroom scenes and frank dialogue too strong for their tastes, and to those who don't find this portrait of Jews at home and at social gatherings too gross for their comfort.

Stanley Jaffe, who gave "Goodbye, Columbus" its

handsome production with colorful scenes of New York City, the Bronx, and plush Westchester, and director Larry Peerce pull no punches in delineating this Jewish milieu—especially in the eating scenes, the one at the wealthy girl's family table (a publicity release informs us that it took 17 hours to film this scene and that 75 pounds of chicken were used), and a later one at the girl's brother's wedding when the Jewish guests pounce on the elaborate array of food as if they'd never eaten before. The trouble with that first family dinner scene is that you begin to feel it's running for 17 hours and you are helping to put away that 75 pounds of chicken. It's no wonder that Neil Klugman, our lower-income young man, wonders what he has gotten into with this Patimkin family. But Neil, for all his intelligent awareness, is not discouraged in his pursuit of the lovely Brenda Patimkin. Or is it she who is pursuing him? Not till later does Neil discover that what lovely Brenda wants, resolute Brenda gets.

The two young people are appealing and are quite nicely played by Richard Benjamin, as the restless Neil, recently out of the army, who doesn't know what he wants, except he knows he doesn't want to continue his job at the public library all his life, and he's almost certain he doesn't want to work for Patimkin Kitchen and Bathroom Sinks, and by pretty Ali MacGraw, who looks just right as the sleek, athletic, determined Brenda who had her nose "fixed" to make herself even prettier. (Why be half-safe?)

The two are surrounded by a good supporting cast: Jack Klugman as the hard-working, now wealthy Mr. Patimkin who adores his family, especially Brenda, looks down his nose at Neil but would accept him as a son-in-law if he's what Brenda wants; Nan Martin as a cool, calculating, well-built Mrs. Patimkin who manages to ask Neil, "How's the library business?"; Michael Meyers as the son of the family, a great big lout who graduated from Ohio State, plays that damned "Goodbye, Columbus" record, and is likable but dumb; Lori Shelle as Brenda's young sister, a spoiled brat who will get ahead and knows how to. In minor roles there are more good, penetrating performances. I suppose director Peerce knows what he's doing in some of these over-played roles, but at times, the exaggerations become obvious. Perhaps what Peerce doesn't realize is how much he borrows from other directors with some of his camera tricks, especially from Mike Nichols whose "Graduate" this movie resembles. However, "Goodbye, Columbus" stands well on its own.

One does wonder, nevertheless, why its makers did certain things. Why did they move the locales from Roth's Newark and Short Hills to the Bronx and Westchester? And why did they update this 1959 novel when some of its ideas are outmoded? All that discussion of diaphragms is passé and perhaps so is the finale for a boy as bright as Neil. What the film-makers couldn't catch in their ad-

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of Fordham University's
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herence to Roth are his pert observations and sly wit. In exaggerating Roth, they fall into caricature. But much of this caricature is funny, and the frankness in dialogue and bedrooms is not in bad taste. No doubt the finale gives

"Goodbye, Columbus" a bitter-sweet flavor. In any case, I liked this ending better than that bus-to-never-neverland at the finish of "The Graduate" and "Three in the Attic."

PHILIP T. HARTUNG

BOOKS

The persistence of myth in urban studies

Explorations in Social Policy

ALVIN L. SCHORR

Basic Books, \$6.95

People and Plans

HERBERT J. GANS

Basic Books, \$10

STEVEN R. WEISMAN

"The great enemy of the truth," said John F. Kennedy, "is very often not the lie—deliberate, contrived and dishonest—but the myth, persistent, persuasive and unrealistic." In urban studies, misleading myths are as pervasive and chronic as the slums they seek to explain. These excellent and thoughtful books, by two distinguished social empiricists, help to clarify why many urban myths continue to prevail and, more important, where they go wrong.

Herbert Gans harbors a healthy distrust for the dogmatic "professionalism" of both his fields, planning and sociology. The professional planner, educator and social theoretician, he says, have been responsible for some of today's most catastrophic policies, from urban renewal that bulldozes whole neighborhoods to ill-considered programs like a restrictive welfare system that distrusts its beneficiary from the outset.

Gans chronicles city planning from its earlier reforming days when planners sought to bring parks and greenery to a crowded and teeming city they felt was inherently evil. Today, the notion has reversed itself, and urbanists, celebrating the city's teeming "vitality," attribute nothing less than the death of civilization to "ticky-tacky" suburban sprawl. Both attitudes are popular

myths. Neither is demonstrably valid, for each indulges in what Gans calls the "fallacy of physical determinism." Gans argues persuasively that planned changes in physical environment unaccompanied by social and economic changes may be meaningless.

Still another myth, that the ghetto's "culture of poverty" requires massive education and counseling programs for poor families, is effectively disputed by both Gans and Alvin Schorr, a deputy assistant secretary in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Too many people assume that the poor lead lives of cultural deprivation, burdened by pressures unknown to the average American. Even Robert Kennedy told reporter Jack Newfield: "I'm very jealous of the fact you grew up in a slum. I wish I did. I wish I had that experience."

Yet does the ghetto dweller suffer from desires and anxieties so unlike anyone else's? In fact, sociologists are only beginning to explore the "cultural" effects of poverty, and also of the variety of government programs instituted to relieve it. Schorr points out that some of the cliché traits people associate with the poor—listlessness, for example—are attributable to very specific and curable conditions, like malnutrition. *Explorations in Social Policy* is most fascinating in its discussion of the discernible effects on personal lives of long-accepted methods for social intervention—settlement houses, subsidized housing and social security, for example.

But both Schorr and Gans agree that much more information is needed on the impact of current programs. Both contend that students of urban phenom-

ena must first learn to ask the right questions. And they agree that what probably shackles the poor most is, quite simply, poverty—and that any "war" on poverty must first use the powerful arsenal of economic assistance.

For Gans, the chief weapon in that arsenal is the provision of jobs. Schorr's concern goes deeper. "By the most extravagant estimate," he says, "perhaps no more than half the poor families (in America) could reasonably improve their situations" even if adequate job-training programs and jobs were provided.

The bulk of Schorr's book delineates the complex inadequacies of present social assistance, such as Aid to Dependent Children and Old Age Assistance. Schorr speaks poignantly from his own bitter experience, describing the "loss of innocence" at HEW when the Detroit riots of 1967 made it clear that "good will and vigorous activity will not suffice."

His criticisms of American "social policy," reflected in its piece-meal and jerry-built assistance programs, are not necessarily new. But the authority he brings from personal experience and the insight with which he presents his evidence make his suggestions worthy of special note.

The essays on "Filial Responsibility and Family Policy" are a good example. Schorr notes that the tradition of a child's responsibility to support his parents is as old as the Fourth Commandment, but that recent social advances like the increase in life span have put the tradition to a test for the first time in this century.

Schorr carefully describes those

government aid programs that refuse to give money to the elderly if their children are at all able to provide support. The original impulse behind such a restriction was an effort to keep families together by limiting the older generation's financial independence. In fact, says Schorr, the opposite has probably happened. The requirement of filial support has forced many poor parents to exert financial strains on families that can ill afford them. Parents have had to move in with their children to make ends meet, and most evidence shows that the unhealthy pressures created by this situation outweigh the advantages. Instability is the likely result. For in truth, says Schorr, only those families with sufficient money will be free of such pressures and instabilities.

Both Schorr and Gans also discuss the *need* for central coordination of social programs to avoid overlap and unintended emphasis. This issue is particularly relevant because of President Nixon's recent creation of a central council for urban affairs. Many of Alvin Schorr's pleas for more coordination of vast federal assistance programs were echoed recently by Daniel P. Moynihan, executive secretary of the new council. Moynihan has been rather philosophical so far, pointing out that urbanism in America is relatively new and that the piece-meal approach of the government has been inevitable. Now, however, it is time to take a long-range view of America's programs and their impact.

One would hope that all the new "czars" for urban affairs—Moynihan, HEW Secretary Robert Finch, Spiro Agnew and Arthur Burns—will read Schorr's book very carefully. They might also give some thought to Herbert Gans' well-made point that central coordination is no good unless that coordination is given the power and resources to achieve its goals. It is not clear, however, how much power urban planners will have in the Nixon Administration in light of those campaign promises of more state and local autonomy in handling urban problems.

In these books of essays, Schorr and Gans contribute to the small but growing amount of undogmatic material that

yields useful theory because it is grounded in actual experience. Their only significant omission, I think, is discussion of political action by the poor. Perhaps they leave such a discussion to those who simply know more about it. But it seems likely that without more politicalization of the poor, the widespread changes advocated so eloquently by Alvin Schorr and Herbert Gans will be long in coming.

The Collected Stories of Jean Stafford

JEAN STAFFORD

Farrar, Straus and Giroux, \$10

IRVING MALIN

Perhaps the clue to Miss Stafford's obsessive themes and images can be found in the last line of "I Love Someone": "My friends and I have managed my life with the best of taste and all that is lacking at this banquet where the appointments are so elegant is something to eat."

Her thirty stories deal with the warped "management" of life. They are arranged in four sections—"The Innocents Abroad"; "The Bostonians, and Other Manifestations of the American Scene"; "Cowboys and Indians, and Magic Mountains"; and "Manhattan Island"—but they tend to return to (or begin with) an isolated heroine who is afraid to leave her troubled self. She is hungry, withdrawn, and frail. She constantly tortures herself. It is only when she escapes from consciousness that she is relatively comfortable and "satisfied."

My favorite stories are "The Echo and the Nemesis," "A Country Love Story," "The Bleeding Heart," "The Interior Castle," "In the Zoo," "Cops and Robbers," and "The End of a Career." These give us the typical motivations, I have stated, but they are able to embody them in striking images.

"The Echo and the Nemesis," for example, deals with the relationship of Sue Ledbetter and Ramona Dunn. Although Sue is attracted to Ramona's vast philological knowledge, she is also troubled by her fatness. The obesity

seems to grow as the story progresses—it becomes *inescapable*. At first we, like Sue, tend to think that it is something to be simply avoided, but we gradually learn that it is demonic. Ramona cannot let go of it because it remains her secret weapon against the world (and herself); it is inextricably bound to her madness. She is torn by what she is *and* what she was; she consumes food to avoid consuming herself. Sue is not let off easily. We understand that although she is unlike her friend, she is a bit too thin and innocent to be healthy. She really wants to be devoured. Thus the story turns upon grotesque reflections: it subtly demonstrates that humanity itself is both "echo and nemesis."

Such insistence upon the damaged body makes the stories more than exercise in narcissism and/or masochism. Miss Stafford suggests that we are trapped in "the body's cage" (to use Benjamin DeMott's phrase) and that no matter how much we try to avoid flesh and food, we must return to them. She makes us terribly aware of mortality.

"The End of a Career" offers a devastating portrait of a Beautiful Woman. Angelica Early regards herself as "simply and solely a beautiful woman." She is neither a "wit, or a catalyst, or a transgressor." She lacks substance because she is so body-oriented. The irony is that as she grows old, she begins to realize that the various plannings of her face cannot renew her. She dies of a weak heart, no longer able to endure her mortal, ugly hands.

I believe that Miss Stafford makes the beautiful grotesque here—what an inversion!—to warn us that we must accept the body and go *beyond* it. She is metaphysical in being so physical. It is, indeed, this ironic marriage which gives her best stories such power. Although some reviewers have condemned her poised, beautiful style as unnecessarily artificial, they have not realized that it is the perfect frame—or should I say body?—for the hideous withdrawals, self-deceptions, and perversions of her heroines. The tension between style ("the best of taste") and content (perverse hunger) is highly charged.

"In the Zoo," perhaps the finest story

in the collection, begins with this paragraph: "Keening harshly in his senility, the blind polar bear slowly and ceaselessly shakes his head in the stark heat of the July and mountain noon. His open eyes are blue. No one stops to look at him; an old farmer, in passing, sums up the old bear's situation by observing, with a ruthless chuckle, that he is a 'back number.' Patient and despairing, he sits on his yellowed haunches on the central rock of his pool, his huge toy paws wearing short boots of mud." The bear is a wonderful symbol of mortality. He is incompletely resigned to his cage. He is wounded but beautiful. He is old but he has "toy paws." He somehow transcends his awkward condition—he is more than a "back number"—because he "ceaselessly shakes his head." Usually Miss Stafford's heroines refuse to shake themselves; they are lifeless, mad, or hungry. But when they fight their cages, knowing that they can never really break them open, they see themselves clearly and, moreover, help to liberate us.

The Faith of the Atheist

ARTHUR GIBSON

Harper & Row, \$5.95


ARMAND MAURER

This is an original and captivating study of modern atheism in its relation to Christianity. Its originality lies mainly in its method. In six chapters Fr. Gibson lets six modern atheists state their cases. Each presents a human value or created good as the "ultimate" in which he puts his "faith" and through which he expects a kind of salvation. For Jean-Paul Sartre this ultimate is freedom, for Henry Miller it is sex, for Albert Camus it is death, for the Marxist it is matter-in-motion, for Nietzsche it is finitude, for Samuel Alexander and A. N. Whitehead it is time. (The author explains that the latter two are somewhat out of place here; they are included among the atheists not because they deny the existence of God but because they conceive him in terms of something more basic than himself.) Each of these

atheistic viewpoints is set forth with fairness and sympathy. The atheist is allowed to speak for himself, Fr. Gibson taking the role of the understanding commentator who does not try to weaken or distort his subject's position but reveals its inner meaning.

After asking the Christian to listen to each of these atheists, Fr. Gibson in a final chapter invites the atheist to give a sympathetic ear to the Christian's faith in God. This interchange of views, the author hopes, will benefit both the atheist and the Christian. The Christian will find that the atheists have something to teach him. Because they take their "ultimates" so seriously, they have vital insights into them which will enrich his own theism. The atheist, for his part, is invited to see the limited character of his own ultimate value, to recognize it for what it is: a creaturely good which, with all other created goods, is included in the Christian's faith in God.

Other chapters could have been added, for example one on Freud. Freudian atheism fits in well with the thesis of the



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


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book. But having been given so much, it is perhaps ungrateful to complain because we have not been given more.

This study takes modern forms of atheism seriously. They are regarded not simply as positions to be rejected or refuted but as viewpoints to be sympathetically understood and evaluated. Not that Fr. Gibson eschews criticism; his book abounds in trenchant and penetrating critical analyses. But he is above all insistent on retaining whatever there is of positive value in the writings of the atheists, while keeping the integrity of his own Catholic faith.

This approach is thoroughly in accord with the best tradition of Catholic theology. Did not the Fathers of the Church assimilate everything of value they could find in pagan authors? And did not medieval theologians first allow their opponents to state their positions before settling the question, always taking into account the valuable insights those opponents might offer? St. Thomas would have us be grateful to everyone who either directly or indirectly teaches us the truth. Even those whose opinions we do not agree with have something to teach us (In *II Metaph.*, lect. 1, nn. 287-288).

Fr. Gibson is particularly well prepared to dialogue with modern atheists. He studied for years at the Russicum in Rome, mastering Russian and reading extensively in modern literature. For six years he was a translator of Russian for the State Department in Washington. He was a peritus at Vatican II and, since 1966, a consultant to the Secretariat for Non-Believers. He recently translated from Italian Cornelio Fabro's monumental *God in Exile: Modern Atheism* (Newman Press, 1964). He is now the acting chairman of the Theology Faculty of St. Michael's College, Toronto.

This book is an important contribution to the current dialogue between Christians and atheists. Its author is convinced of the imperative need of this dialogue in the face of the world situation, and he is confident of its success. He shares the optimism of Teilhard de Chardin, who called upon all men, believers and non-believers, to unite in

raising mankind to a "threshold of greater consciousness." Both believers and non-believers, Teilhard thought, "can advance hand in hand, because their attitudes, far from being exclusive, virtually prolong each other, and ask only to be completed."

Without wishing to dampen the enthusiasm of the dialogists, one would only like to recall that a condition of good dialogue is mutual understanding and hence frank expression of basic differences as well as agreements. The atheist and theist must recognize that they do adopt opposite, and even contradictory, attitudes when, for example, the one believes that man and the world are self-sufficient and the other believes that they are not. One can hope that from the attitudes, ideas and aspirations they have in common they will grow in ever greater unity in truth.

It is precisely here that Fr. Gibson's book will prove useful in advancing the dialogue between the atheist and theist. His own interpretation of their views is frank and honest and it is bound to lead to greater mutual understanding. The dialogue he is engaged in is difficult indeed, but it has a chance of succeeding if it uses the method of this book.

A Constitutional Faith

HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK

Knopf, \$3.95

Disobedience and Democracy

HOWARD ZINN

Random House, \$3.95

WILLIAM B. GOULD

A Constitutional Faith contains the three James S. Carpentier lectures delivered by Mr. Justice Black at Columbia Law School last spring. The collection makes interesting reading as it touches on the issues before the Supreme Court which seem to produce some of the hottest debate: "judicial activism," "judicial restraint," due process of law, and the free speech issues involved in the First Amendment.

In *A Constitutional Faith* one finds Justice Black's literalist interpretation of

the Bill of Rights (i.e., Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech means that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech)—a constitutional philosophy that has now put him at odds with both the so-called activists and restraint wings of the Court. It was not always so. And Justice Black is at pains to stress—unsuccessfully I think—that whatever else has changed, it is not *his* approach to constitutional problems.

In one respect his views remain constant. Justice Black has always taken the position that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and its Due Process Clause intended to make *all* of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states as well as the federal government. This is a historical argument which has never persuaded a majority of the Court—but, practically speaking, its goals have been realized through a process of “selective incorporation” through which the Court has imposed Bill of Rights obligations upon the states in just about every area except double jeopardy.

Justice Black has always believed that anything short of his incorporation theory permits the judiciary to apply a kind of judge-made “natural law” to the states and to set criminal convictions aside—as Justice Frankfurter did in *Rochin v. California* 342 U.S. 165 (1952)—on the basis of what “shocks the conscience.” In Justice Black’s view this permits the judge to substitute his own notions of due process for valid constitutional standards.

On the other hand, Mr. Justice Frankfurter—the leader of the “self-restraint” proponents—thought that incorporation would plunge the courts into the historically unjustified task of federal supervision of the state judiciary. Thus, despite their fierce battles, these two giants of the Court both—in their own way—were deeply concerned with the problems that would flow from unfettered judicial discretion. Justice Black’s “activist” position shows that whether one can be characterized as an activist or restraint advocate depends very much on how one frames the issues.

In recent years Justice Black—per-

haps smarting from criticism which saw his defense of the Bill of Rights as a demonstration of his *own* love for principles contained therein—has taken the view, in dissent, that poll taxes do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause (*Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections* 383 U.S. 663 [1963]) and that a Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute does not violate a married couple’s constitutional “right of privacy” (*Griswold v. Connecticut* 381 U.S. 479 [1965]). True to his literalistic approach, Black says that since the Constitution does not specifically prohibit this kind of state action the courts cannot intervene.

These lectures make it clear that the Court’s propensity to strike down social and economic legislation in the early part of the century haunts Black as it did Frankfurter. Despite the distinctly broader scope of judicial review which is implied in the flat prohibitions of governmental action by some of the Bill of Rights (particularly the First Amendment) and the Fourteenth Amendment, increasingly one finds Justice Black deferring to government’s alleged need to control new modes of communication. Surely the Constitution makes judicial review of other branches of government a more careful one in the case of speech and race discrimination, for instance, than is the case with substantive political judgments of government dealing with other subject matter. Moreover, while one should adhere faithfully as possible to the exact written word of the Constitution the process is not as simple as *A Constitutional Faith* implies. As Professor Archibald Cox has said: “Law must be binding even upon the highest court, but it must meet the needs of men and match their ethical sensibilities.” *A Constitutional Faith* refuses to realistically address itself to this dilemma.

The most fascinating portion of this book deals with the First Amendment and Justice Black’s recently expressed hostility towards civil rights demonstrations in the streets. Although the demonstrations have been orderly in all cases which have been presented to the Court, Justice Black warns against ex-

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tending First Amendment protections to "tramping, singing, shouting, angry groups" who engage in "loud praying" and who invade privacy by picketing homes. But these characterizations hardly fit the facts of cases which were before Justice Black and the Court. They thus demonstrate Justice Black's predisposition to be tough on the new brand of Negro "evangelism" and his willingness to "balance away" the right to protest and dramatize the evils of racial discrimination. What is truly surprising here is that "balancing"—through which government's legitimate interest in regulation is balanced against First Amendment rights (usually in favor of the former)—is a process which Justice Black has found odious in other contexts.

Here, however, the Justice analogizes civil rights demonstrations with labor picketing cases where the Court permits a degree of state regulation because picketing is something more than speech—i.e., "speech plus." But surely there is much more communication

contained in the protest against racial discrimination. Picketing is very often a "signal" to workers and customers to turn back from the line without a serious consideration of the issues involved. That kind of uncritical response is not inherent in the civil rights street demonstration.

And it is interesting to see Justice Black talking about the streets as "government property"—rather than the appropriate forum for people who may have no other means to express their views. The Supreme Court has held that the sidewalks are permissible areas for other kinds of communication—e.g., distribution of literature.

For Justice Black speech, however, is only verbal or written. Thus he is able to rationalize his view that literature can be distributed on public sidewalks despite the littering problem. But as the *New York Times'* Tom Wicker has written: "One has only to think of those 'moments of silence' observed in countless churches, schools and other gatherings to know that free speech may be more than something oral or written."

It is difficult to imagine that the civil rights movement would have achieved its limited success were it not for such street demonstrations. The good Justice seems to have let the "black power" alarm get the best of him.

But if Justice Black has become too cautious Professor Howard Zinn cannot be similarly categorized. Zinn's tract *Disobedience and Democracy* is an attack on Mr. Justice Fortas' views on the need for a rule of law (see Fortas' *Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience*).

Mr. Zinn says that Mr. Justice Fortas' essay is "... very close to the statements on law and order we find everywhere today. . . ." The fact of the matter is that Justice Fortas' views are anything but what falls under the label of "law and order"—insofar as that term implies repressive governmental action against protestors. A reading of Zinn's book indicates that his reasoning in dealing with this very difficult problem of civil disobedience is about as defective as his mistakes in interpreta-

tion. Here are just a few examples of what I mean.

Zinn sees nothing important about a rule of law and criticizes Justice Fortas' point that one who is civilly disobedient must accept his punishment by the courts. One should be able to violate the law, according to Zinn, depending upon whether the law comports with one's own moral code. If people pick and choose between obeying laws that are morally sound and those that are not, the moral standards contained in the legal code will improve.


How then does one stop the likes of Governors Wallace and Barnett from disobeying the law on the basis of their "conscience"? That's easy, says Zinn. When one deals with civil disobedience, it is *conduct* rather than *speech*. When one is dealing with conduct, one can support "beneficial" acts and oppose the "harmful" ones. Harmful conduct is civil disobedience by Barnett and Wallace.

What Zinn completely overlooks is that a viewpoint or "speech" gives rise to the conduct and that by throwing Barnett and Wallace in jail for their "conduct" Zinn is picking and choosing on the basis of what is "good" or "bad" speech. Apparently Zinn himself will be the censor who will decide where to draw the line between "good" people who believe as he does and silly or evil people who, for instance, might not be willing to castigate the United States as a devil—as he does—in the Vietnamese conflict.

All of this is not to say that Justice Fortas has written the last word on civil disobedience. Like Mr. Zinn, moreover, I find his notions concerning the "progress" of black people (e.g., Thurgood Marshall's appointment to the Supreme Court) to be unrealistic. The enormity of unredressed racial grievances must be brought home to the American people more clearly. But I am afraid that Mr. Zinn's proposals help us precious little in this regard.

Moreover, it is interesting to note that his book—which is full of optimism about the results that can be achieved through violating the law—does not even *mention* the political shift

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to the right which took place in this country last fall. Nor does Zinn consider the possibility that people like himself have encouraged the middle class majority to move in that direction. Could it be that George Wallace thrives on books like *Disobedience and Democracy* and those who take its message seriously?

Rudolf Bultmann in Catholic Thought

THOMAS O'MEARA &
DONALD WEISSER (eds.)

Herder and Herder, \$5.95

WILLIAM A. SCOTT

This is a collection of ten essays of dialogue with the thought of Rudolf Bultmann by Roman Catholic theologians and biblical exegetes. Each essay examines one or other aspect of that thought clearly, sympathetically, and yet critically. Bultmann's weaknesses are uncovered but the main thrust is towards reflection on those of his insights that are of value to theology's continuing search to make the Word of God presently meaningful.

All of Bultmann's major themes are dealt with. His use of Heidegger's existential categories in fashioning the questions that contemporary man should ask of the Scriptures is well handled in Helmut Peukert's "Bultmann and Heidegger." Claude Geffré analyzes the relationship between kerygma and history, pointing out that it is always the former that makes the latter present, that all of history is finally contained in what historical facts mean to my existential, here-and-now situation.

Bultmann's method of scriptural exegesis and its basic hermeneutical principle, the preliminary understanding one brings to the text, is probed for its strength and its weakness by several of the authors. That preliminary understanding, "never without its own pre-suppositions," but always governed by "the interpreter's relationship in his life to the subject," is seen as strong in that it makes the Scripture meaningful to me, weak in that it constantly moves towards an unwarranted subjectivism. The needed corrective can only be sup-



plied by letting one's preliminary understanding be questioned by the text itself rather than the other way around.

Heinrich Fries deals with Bultmann's program of demythologizing the Scripture in a thoughtful discussion of the difference between "Demythologizing and Theological Truth," concluding that each of these modes of expressing religious truth ought to be seen as encountering the other in a dialectical tension of similarity and opposition. It is the preservation of the tension that renders both more fruitful.

Josef Blank ("Bultmann and the Gospel According to John") uncovers one of Bultmann's basic weaknesses; his tendency to see the message of the Word of God as addressed primarily to the individual. The meaning of Scripture is found by asking: what does it mean for me? But, as Blank rightly asks: . . . "how should this 'for me' be understood? Does it refer primarily to the individual believer or does it mean the believer within a community of believers, the Church?" Bultmann's scriptural message is too individualistically orientated. There is little sense of Christianity as essentially community.

As one reads the book, two impressions are slowly formed, one the realization that Bultmann was among the first to discern and grapple with today's theological problems, the other the recognition that theology now needs to go beyond him. Thomas O'Meara's essay, "Bultmann and Tomorrow's Theology," the final piece in the book and the most valuable because of its synthesis of Bultmann's key ideas and its review of the directions in which theologians are presently moving from these ideas, brings these impressions into clear focus. By so doing, the essay poses the book's final question: where does theology go after Bultmann?

Where it will go will depend on its ability to read and respond creatively to the signs of the times, particularly the twin fact of accelerating change and man's incapacity for faith. Perennially conceived of as the "explicitation of eternal verities," theology faces its gravest problem when it confronts change which grows even more rapid. How



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does theology, or for that matter, religion itself, wed the apparently mutually exclusive notions of eternal verity and accelerating change?

There are those who would say the wedding was effected in the Incarnation (Chardin for one). But most would see there is still a long road to be traveled between making such a statement and effecting its concrete presence in today's world. Those who have hope the task can be accomplished rest that hope on the beginnings made by men like Bultmann, or Chardin, or Bonhoeffer, or by the theologians of hope and the future, or by those who recognize the inadequacy of our present religious language, or by those who are trying to make historical consciousness a necessary category of all thinking.

All of these are signs of a beginning confrontation with today's incapacity for belief, but perhaps the most realistic stance now is to see this as a time for studying the great minds of our im-



REVIEWERS

STEVEN R. WEISMAN, a 1968 Yale graduate, works for the *New York Times*.

IRVING MALIN is the author of *Saul Bellow's Fiction* (Southern Illinois University Press) and the editor of *Saul Bellow and the Critics* (N.Y.U. Press).

FATHER ARMAND MAURER, C.S.B., teaches at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto.

WILLIAM B. GOULD is on the faculty of Wayne State University.

FATHER WILLIAM A. SCOTT, S.J., chairman of the theology department at LeMoyne College, is currently on sabbatical leave.

WALTER E. ARNOLD, a former associate editor of *Commonweal*, has taught philosophy. He is now an editor at E.P. Dutton.

mediate past. It is in them that the future needs to be discerned either by way of disagreement or of further probing.

From this perspective, the present book serves a useful purpose. In generally clear language (American readers may find the German essays somewhat ponderous) the thought of a giant is tested for its guidelines into the future. What comes after Bultmann will in another sense come out of him. This book can provide guidelines for the future of theology.

American Philosophy and the Future

EDIT. MICHAEL NOVAK

Scribners, \$7.95

WALTER ARNOLD

A century ago American philosophy like American literature was assumed by foreigners and most Americans to be a droll boast. Recently Mr. Lewis Feuer, in a celebrated article, announced that American philosophy was dead. That is at least a more promising state than nonentity. But whether or not a resurrection is imminent, there is currently a rediscovery which is growing apace. Curiously, it seems to accompany a greater concern for genuinely international, if not universal, philosophy. Like the movement of the last century, this is a blessed change from fixation upon Anglian modes of thought and habits of the tongue.

The present collection of essays is a useful contribution to the rediscovery of American philosophy. The book, however, is not well served by its title,

since the stipulation for each of the contributions was to start with a look at some outstanding American philosopher or lineage of the past and only then to consider the bearing of these on present and conceivably future issues. So most of the chapters primarily concern the positions of Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead, Royce or Whitehead, and some are exclusively about these thinkers. That is all to the good, as the contributions generally are, but it does not make the book a revolutionary statement or a manifesto as some may be led to believe by its title. "Essays for a New Generation" is the subtitle, however, and that may be taken for the hope it implies.

If nothing else, the book once again proves the forcefulness and centrality of William James in our tradition. His is the name and his are the themes that recur most often in the eleven chapters. One of the most readable and judicious of these is a short essay by Paul Van Buren commending James the metaphysician to our present dilemmas in philosophy and religion. Van Buren is a little too eager to line James up with the later Wittgenstein on language and meaning, but he exposes an angle of James' thought that could be helpful to philosophical ecumenism.

Aside from the bearing of his thought on linguistic philosophy (to the still fashionable sway of which this volume forms an agreeable, if deceptive, counterweight), it has been apparent for some time that James was a phenomenologist ahead of his time. Lately, James M. Edie has been illuminating that strain in James' work, and here he contributes a very able exposition of *The Varieties of Religious Experience* as a phenomenological analysis. That great work has uses beyond phenomenology, but Prof. Edie shows its pre-eminence in that enterprise.

It is necessary to point out that because of a controllable decision of the editor, a disproportionate number of the book's chapters concern religious philosophy and philosophical theology. Surely a deliberate attempt, such as Mr. Novak has made, to exclude any special considerations of empirical science

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excludes a very great part of the American contribution to philosophy as well as a good part of the future. But, more surprisingly, there is also very little direct consideration of social, political and historical philosophy in the book. It is just in these areas that the generally dreary analytic guild philosophy of largely Oxbridge derivation has seemed most deficient and that certain inclinations in American philosophy seem most promising. Only Robert C. Pollock's "Dream and Nightmare: The Future as Revolution" takes up the social dimension directly. With a playful strenuousness he suggests the jazzband as an excellent metaphor for the American sense of community, and that by itself will stick in the mind. Also Robert M. Barry contributes a helpful view of the urban bearings of George Herbert Mead's highly original philosophizing.

In the predominant religious vein, one of the most interesting efforts in the volume is Daniel Callahan's acute examination of the "personalistic theism" of the now much neglected Boston University philosopher Edgar Brightman. Mr. Callahan not only provides a lucid brief exposition of Brightman's impressive metaphysics, he also takes the occasion to raise some very striking questions about our way of conceiving God and "what there is." That Mr. Callahan's metaphysical and linguistic proposals carry very peculiar implications for our supposed knowledge of the real does not mean they are not essential to consider.

Among the contributions focusing upon individual philosophers there is an excellent one by David B. Burrell on C. S. Peirce's theory of inquiry and judgment, "Knowing as a Passionate and Personal Quest." This exposition shows that for Peirce the sense of truth is finally aesthetic. It also tends to show that every great pragmatist contains a great idealist.

Considering idealists, James Collins has written an expectedly good chapter on Josiah Royce as an analyst of religion as community. Also Andrew Reck contributes a brief assessment of Whitehead's legacy to speculative

American philosophy. It is surprising that no chapters deal with Emerson, Thoreau and the Transcendentalist thrust, especially in view of recent movements among the young in social and political life. But the omission of any study of Santayana's achievement is especially remarkable. If only as a critic of the character and presumptions of American life and thought, Santayana is invaluable. He stands for much more, and his true measure has yet to be taken, but his absence from this volume is most regrettable.

To return to the actual offerings, there is a very energetic attempt by John J. McDermott to sketch a "radically empirical aesthetic" out of the accomplishment of modern art and some of the ideas that James and Dewey cultivated in their psychologies and theories of meaning. Prof. McDermott's approach may throw more light upon metaphysical problems than upon art, but he succeeds in conveying a sense of the excitement and importance of aesthetics in contemporary philosophy and civilization.

"Experienceable difference" is one of pragmatism's leading ideas, and R. W. Sleeper attempts to apply it to basic metaphysical and religious beliefs in the longest essay in the book. He manages to unite a number of difficult and seemingly disparate lines of thought in the search for a principle of verification. If his conclusions are open to the charge of *petitio principii*, that has always been brought against the pragmatic test of truth. The fault may, however, be in those of us who lust after clarity.

The lingering charms of the "linguistic revolution" (that *ancien régime* of the schools) are evident in one of the oddest of the book's chapters, "How Is Religious Talk Justifiable?" by James Wm. McClendon, Jr. It is in fact an interesting attempt to outline a theory of the meaning of "religious language" which will do justice both to the claims of religious experience and the general analysis of language. Prof. McClendon follows the late master of the clues in the New English Dictionary, John L. Austin, particularly in the latter's William James (*sic!*) Lectures at Harvard,

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25 April 1969: 181

How To Do Things With Words. The conclusion of the essay is reassuring, if hardly startling: "What follows is that there is no absolutely foolproof justification of those central clusters of convictions by which we live, by which we are what we are." That may just demonstrate that we should not go to philosophical analysts for startling conclusions.

American Philosophy and the Future, then, promises much and yields much less. For all of its implied criticism of what the schools generally offer, there is a disappointing academic flavor to most of the articles. Perhaps if the authors had been encouraged to write more free-wheeling essays without the usual retarding (to the reader) scholarly apparatus, the results would have been more lively. At least the writing might have been. Certainly that would have been in the spirit of William James, who in letters near the end of his life railed and fulminated against the scholasticizing of the young Ph.D.'s in the "learned periodicals." Certainly a greater diversity of backgrounds and interests among the contributors would

have justified more the expectation that the philosophical perspectives of the future were being opened up here. But it is enough for now that the book helps put down the rumor that American philosophy is dead. If nothing else we are reminded how fecund the progenitors were, how worthwhile their unfinished work.

CORRESPONDENCE

(Continued from page 155)

claims to have given Ché Guevara's Bolivian campaign diary to Cuba. Arguedas told me, "I do not consider the Gulf and other contracts made when I was minister of government to have been surrenders to economic imperialism. Bolivia desperately needs foreign capital and must strive only to make that capital responsible." This Barrientos is doing.

Hirschfield does not seem to realize that the reason Ché Guevara failed in Bolivia, although xenophobia played a part, was not because he was defeated militarily but precisely because the Bolivian National Revolution launched by the MNR in 1952 and continuing under Barrientos has indeed transformed Bolivian life. To say that Barrientos is "the Pontius Pilate of Latin America's revolutionary history" whose "function is to suppress the present, to preserve the past for nervous predators who have no future," as Hirschfield does, is both intellectually dishonest and socially unperceptive. Ché Guevara sought to discredit what he considered a bourgeois revolution supported by the United States, not realizing that that revolutionary movement had stolen his thunder and would end by discrediting him.

JERRY W. KNUDSON
University of Kentucky

Reply

Professor Knudson's name-calling is understandable. Defending General Barrientos is no easy task. Interestingly, the Professor reveals himself more by what he omits than by what he states.

At the outset he claims that I made "at least" twelve errors in my article, but nowhere does he mention even one of them concretely. But far more important is the Professor's absolute silence regarding the General's crushing of Bolivian trade unionism, his massacring of tin miners, his nulling of all constitutional guarantees by clamping Bolivia in a perpetual state of siege. Does he perhaps think that by failing to acknowledge these outrages they will conveniently go away? As for the General's shameful yielding of his country's wealth to foreign corporations, all Professor Knudson can do is to lamely blame this on the "Marxist" Arguedas.

Professor Knudson to the contrary, General Barrientos is not carrying on the 1952 revolution, but is hammering the final nails into its coffin. The 1952 revolution brought about the nationalization of the tin mines. Barrientos is denationalizing the mines by permitting their financing to be done by U.S. and German firms. The 1952 revolution made the workers co-administrators of the mines. Barrientos has put the administration of the mines almost exclusively in the hands of foreigners. The 1952 revolution destroyed the army and spawned the workers' militias. Barrientos destroyed these militias and made mighty the army. The 1952 revolution ended massacres in Bolivia. Barrientos resumed them. Perhaps it is the Professor who ought to have done his homework before charging off to South America.

ROBERT CARL HIRSCHFIELD

Israel Revisited

New York
To the Editors: Apparently Mr. Southwick [March 28] did not read my letter [Feb. 28] to the end. I needed no answer on what I had not suggested. Indeed, contrary to what he infers, I did not advocate "continuous occupancy" as sufficient proof for the State of Israel's right to exist. It is unnecessary to repeat here what I did suggest since I trust that *Commonweal* subscribers are more careful readers than Albert Southwick. Yet, since the latter

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For a free copy of Wm. F. Buckley's NATIONAL REVIEW, write: Dept. G, 150 E. 35 Street, N. Y. 10016.

chooses to raise again the "continuous occupancy" argument—in the Arabs' favor—may I point out that Arab occupancy could have gone on undisturbed had not the Arab leaders advised the Palestinian inhabitants to leave. The Palestinians could have stayed right where their ancestors had lived for centuries, the only difference being an Israeli administration instead of a Turkish or a British one, since there never was an Arab Palestine State. This is not to dismiss the very real Arab plight; it is only one more attempt at setting the record a little straighter.

CLAIRE HUCHET BISHOP

Secular Theology Lives!

Santa Clara

To the Editors: I must object to the uncritical ease with which Mr. Philip Deasy, in his review of Martin Marty's *The Search for a Usable Future* [March 28] assumes the death of secular theology. "Mr. Marty's deft demolition of the secular theologians will hasten its [relevance's] demise." Such a statement reflects a preference for alliteration over

accuracy. Demolition, indeed. The fact that the review continues to use the past tense of the verb "to be" when discussing secular theology is a bit annoying.

"Secular theology" is indeed a term which is broad enough to include not only the "early" Cox and the "Death of God" theologians; but also the extremely serious and profound work of philosophers such as Martin Heidegger and theologians such as Ray L. Hart. Heidegger speaks of our time as one in which "the gods have fled." And Dr. Hart's book, only recently published (*Unfinished Man and the Imagination*), explains why the gods have fled, and what Christian theology must do about it.

Secular theology is far from its "demise." If it ever should be "demolished," the instruments of its destruction will be more potent than glib observational comments. Just saying it doesn't make it so.

DANIEL O. DUGAN

Theology Dept.

Univ. of Santa Clara

Denial From IPPA

London

To the Editors: I have read a copy of the article written by Leonard J. Berry entitled "Il Papa and the Pill" [March 28].

In the last column of this article, Mr. Berry writes:

"When a woman goes to IADE, she is referred to a doctor who, for a fee of \$5 (poor people, free), prescribes a suitable method of contraception; \$1.60 of the fee is returned to IADE, which gets 40 percent of its funding from the kickbacks and contributions; the rest comes from the International Planned Parenthood Association and the Path Finder Fund."

I would draw your attention to the fact that the International Planned Parenthood Association does not give financial support to the Associazione Italiana per l'Educazione Demografica.

JOAN RETTIE

Regional Secretary

IPPA



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